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I. INTRODUCTION
The fall of communism in the late 1980s and early 1990s
has substantially changed the world map. The region once
occupied by the Soviet Union now consists of a number of
smaller countries (former Soviet Republics), each of which has
inherited all the faults and greatness of the former Soviet
Empire. The state-controlled economy in the Soviet Union was
designed to accumulate a gigantic military power necessary to
win a "competition" with the Western world. The general
wealth of the Soviet population was irrelevant to this task and,
therefore, the consumer goods and services industry was kept
at the bottom of the priorities list. These irregularities of the
state-controlled economy in the Soviet Union have produced a
paradoxical situation in the economies of the former Soviet
Republics: while possessing enormous natural resources and
highly developed heavy-machinery enterprises, these countries
are often unable to supply their population with necessities,
such as food and clothing.
The alternative to starvation and decay for these countries
has become a fast transition to a market economy. Such transi-
tion requires a great deal of money, and former communist
countries are now energetically searching for new sources to
raise capital. Although international organizations, such as the
World Bank or International Monetary Fund (IMF), provide
financial aid to the former Soviet Republics,' this aid cannot
replace economic means of capital raising. To that end, such
capital-raising techniques as commercial loans, direct invest-
1. For instance, the loans to Kazakhstan from the World Bank totaled
US$300 million in 1995, and the IMF agreed to a standby agreement worth some
US$300 million. See Eastern Europe Finance: Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan Up-
date, Economist Intelligence Unit ViewsWire, May 25, 1995, available in LEXIS,
World Library, Eiunws File. The aid from these and other world organizations
driven by geopolitical (and perhaps philanthropic) goals is outside the scope of this
paper.
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ments, and capital markets should be considered seriously,
however difficult they may be.
This article concentrates on one of the capital-raising
methods: the creation of a securities market. As an example of
the introduction of a securities market into the economy of a
former communist country, this article examines an experience
of the Republic of Kazakhstan, one of the richest of the former
Soviet Republics.
Although a securities market appears to be an attractive
money-making mechanism, not every country can afford it.
Part II of this article argues that Kazakhstan has the economic
prerequisites necessary to maintain such a market: issuers of
securities willing to offer their stocks to investors; a fast-grow-
ing industry of financial intermediaries; and a number of West-
ern institutional investors willing to bid on the Kazakhstani
market.
The brief description of the Kazakhstani economy provided
in Part II indicates that the country has vast natural resources
and a substantial number of highly developed industrial enter-
prises. These assets are in the process of being privatized as
joint stock companies. As a result, the Kazakhstani market has
a large supply of securities that can be traded on the market.
In addition, the Kazakhstani economy has witnessed the rise
of financial institutions necessary to support the market. Part
II describes the Kazakh Stock Exchange and the trading activi-
ties that provide excellent experience -for securities industry
professionals in Kazakhstan.
Part H further indicates that the Kazakhstani securities
market can and will attract attention of global institutional
investors. Applying one of the economic models for the evalua-
tion of emerging markets, Part II posits that investment in
Kazakhstani securities may increase both the return and safe-
ty of an investment portfolio. To underscore the discussion of
economic prerequisites to the creation of a securities market,
Part II weighs, from the Kazakhstani perspective, the benefits
of capital raising through the securities market against such
capital-raising methods as direct investment by a few multina-
tional corporations' or commercial loans.
2. Investments by foreign investment companies presume the existence of liq-
uid securities, and therefore the existence of a securities market. Such investments
should be distinguished from direct investments by large foreign corporations that
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Having established the existence of economic prerequisites
necessary to develop a viable securities market, Part III argues
that the only alternative to a government-regulated securities
market is undesirable chaotic securities trading that will inhib-
it, rather than improve, the capital-raising function of the
securities market. Such an inference is supported by the expe-
rience of other developing countries that have adopted securi-
ties regulation in order to bring fairness and order to the secu-
rities market, and to help the development of this market.
It should be noted that Kazakhstani securities regulation
is necessarily different from the traditional regulatory model
existing in developed countries. While securities regulation in
the United States and the United Kingdom primarily responds
to changing conditions in already existing markets,
Kazakhstani regulation is designed to assist in building and
developing the market. Therefore, it should anticipate, rather
than respond to, market needs. Consequently, Part III argues
that the anticipatory nature of the Kazakhstani regulatory
scheme poses a particularly difficult task for the government of
striking the proper balance between over- and under-regula-
tion.
Keeping in mind the differences between anticipatory and
responsive regulation, Part III examines the Kazakhstan Secu-
rities Decree, comparing it to the United States securities
statutes. Special emphasis is given to the powers of the Na-
tional Securities Commission (NSC), registration and disclo-
sure requirements, and the definitional section of the Decree.
Possible remedies for violations of this law are discussed in the
context of the newly adopted Civil Code of the Republic of
Kazakhstan. With respect to liabilities, Part III argues that
Kazakhstan needs to define and outlaw specifically, rather
than in general terms, manipulative and fraudulent practices
in its securities industry.
Part III further discusses steps that might be undertaken
by the Kazakhstani government to ensure proper functioning
of the securities market. Given the specifics of Kazakhstani
privatization, the country will require specialized legislation
governing the activities of investment companies. Further, Part
III gives an overview of the draft of the Investment Company
are, in essence, venture capital investments.
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Law that is pending before the Kazakhstani legislature.
The article concludes that with proper legislative and
enforcement actions, Kazakhstan can become a very attractive
securities market and at the same time raise much-needed
capital for its perestroika.'
II. ECONOMIC PREREQUISITES TO THE CREATION OF A
SECURITIES MARKET IN KAzAKHSTAN
A securities market can be defined in many ways. Most
commonly, it is understood as a system (or a place, if we speak
about stock exchanges) where sellers and buyers of securities
are brought together by financial intermediaries, such as bro-
kers and dealers. Clearly, a securities market is too complex to
be comprehensively described by this simple statement. None-
theless, a securities market can be created, at least arguably,
in any country that has business entities willing to raise capi-
tal through the issuance and distribution of their securities;
investors, foreign or domestic, interested in investing in this
market; and financial intermediaries capable of providing ave-
nues for securities trading. Even though the presence of these
elements in a national economy may not be sufficient to create
a fully functioning market, they constitute building blocks for
the creation of a market. An overview of economic conditions in
Kazakhstan indicates that these elements are present in its
economy.
A. Issuers
Kazakhstan has always been one of the wealthiest Soviet
Republics. This land, hardly known to an average American,
covers a vast territory in Central Asia stretching between
Siberia, the Caspian Sea, and China. It is populated by the
descendants of the great warriors of the East, by Germans
exiled by Stalin from the central parts of Russia during World
War II, and by an ethnically diverse, Russian- and Ukrainian-
dominated population created by the communist agricultural
experiments of the Khruschev era.4 Kazakhstan possesses
3. Perestroika is a Russian word meaning remodeling. Introduced into the
world political vocabulary by Mikhail Gorbachev, this word symbolizes the transi-
tion of former communist countries to a market economy and a democratic society.
4. The ethnic breakdown of the Kazakhstani population is as follows:
540 [Vol. XXII:3
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enormous natural resources which include coal mines in the
north and the Tengiz oil deposits, the largest known oil field in
the world, in its western region.5 Kazakhstan also mines large
quantities of copper, zinc, lead, bauxites, chromites, iron, sil-
ver, and gold.6 In agriculture, it is the only exporter of wheat
among former Soviet Republics.7
In addition to vast natural resources, Kazakhstan has a
relatively developed industrial sector.8 In part, the industrial
development in Kazakhstan has been prompted by a need to
process its large natural resources and to serve its agricultural
sector. Thus, it maintains phosphate mines and fertilizer pro-
cessing plants? But most important, only a few years ago, the
Kazakhstani economy was a vital part of a Soviet military
Goliath. Soviet spaceships were launched from the Baikonur
space-launching center located in Kazakhstan.' ° This proximi-
ty to the space launching center has led to the creation in
Kazakhstan of a highly developed heavy-machinery industry,
mostly tied into the old Soviet defense complex."
All this economic wealth hardly had any impact on the
development of a securities market when the Kazakhstani
economy was fully controlled by the state. The situation
changed, however, when in 1993 Kazakhstan embarked on an
ambitious privatization program. As will be described later,
this program has been designed to convert state-owned enter-
Kazakh, 41.9%; Russian, 37.0%; Ukrainian, 5.2%; German, 4.7%; and other, 11.2%.
See CHARLES UNDELAND & NICHOLAS PLATT, THE CENTRAL ASIAN REPUBLICS:
FRAGMENTS OF EMPIRE, MAGNETS OF WEALTH 31 (1994).
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See id. at 4.
11. See id. at 33. The Soviet economy was regulated by the Gosplan in a
highly arbitrary fashion. Therefore, it is difficult to determine what exactly made
Kazakhstan one of the centers of the Soviet military industry. In addition to the
benefit of physical proximity to Baikonur, the military industry may have been
developed in Kazakhstan because it has large and scarcely populated territories.
See id at 31. Proximity to the Soviet-Chinese border may have been another rea-
son. In any event, Kazakhstan does have a fair number of highly developed heavy-
machinery enterprises. See id. at 33.
12. See id. at 34; Kazakhstan: Privatization Progress, NaVl Trade Data Bank
Market Rept., Nov. 13, 1993, para. 1, available in LEXIS, Market Library,
Mktrpt File [hereinafter U.S. Embassy Report]. This report was prepared at the
American Embassy in Almaty, Kazakhstan.
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prises into private companies organized in a form of joint-stock
companies. These companies are becoming the issuers of
securities, thus contributing the first building block of a securi-
ties market.
In early 1991, some 37,200 wholly state-owned enterprises
operated in Kazakhstan.'4 Of these, the State Property Man-
agement Committee ("Goskomimuschestvo" or "GKI"' 5 de-
fined 10% as large, 30% as medium-sized, and 60% as small. 6
About 30,000 of these small-scale enterprises have been or will
be privatized.'7 The program itself was devised by the
Kazakhstani government in cooperation with the World Bank
and the United States Agency for International Development
(US AID), and is in essence a cash-and-voucher (coupon)-based
model, similar to those in other former Soviet Republics. 8
The privatization consists of three parts: small scale,
19
mass,20 and a case-by-case privatization of large and special
enterprises. 2' Small-scale enterprises are those with under
200 employees and a book value of less than five million rubles
of fixed capital as of January 1, 1993.22 Small-scale enterpris-
es are sold for cash and coupons (in equal portions) in open
auctions. 2' Since bidders are required to pay one-half of the
purchase price in coupons, buyers are faced with a tremendous
burden of finding enough coupon sellers. 24
The mass privatization program provides for the sale or
divestiture of approximately 8,000 state-owned enterprises
with between 200 and 5,000 employees.' These enterprises
will be set up as 100% state-owned joint stock companies, after
which the GKI will' sell at least 51% of their shares at special-
ized voucher auctions.26 Under the mass privatization model,
13. See infra note 28 and accompanying text.
14. See U.S. Embassy Report, supra note 12, para. 11.
15. See id. para. 6.
16. See id. para. 11.
17. See id. para. 8.
18. See id. paras. 1, 2, 7.
19. See id. paras. 12-23.
20. See id. paras. 24-27.
21. See id. paras. 28-29.
22. See id. para. 12.
23. See id. para. 13.
24. See id. para. 15.
25. See id. para. 24.
26. See id. paras. 24-25.
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citizens will be able to join their vouchers in investment funds
and collectively bid for stakes in the enterprises.27 About 144
private investment funds are now bidding on behalf of the
citizens in privatization auctions." Foreigners are not allowed
to take part in this privatization (although they certainly can
buy already-privatized shares in the secondary market).
Finally, the case-by-case privatization is designed to privatize
approximately 200-250 very large enterprises with more than
5,000 employees, and about 1,000 enterprises that require
special regulatory involvement (like those exploiting natural
resources)." The privatization of these companies has no pre-
designed plan and will be done on a case-by-case basis because
of the financial and regulatory uniqueness of each such enter-
prise."' Foreigners can bid for such enterprises even at the
first stage 6f privatization, without waiting for secondary trad-
ing.32 For instance, in 1993, Philip Morris bought a 49% stake
in the Kazakhstan Tobacco Company.33
By October 1994, small-scale privatization was practically
completed, and virtually all small enterprises had become
joint-stock companies controlled by shareholders.' Mass pri-
vatization is under way, and in the immediate future most of
the remaining state-controlled enterprises will also become
joint-stock companies.35 The voucher system of privatization
has created a substantial number of publicly held issuers and
has spread the ownership of these companies among the mem-
bers of the general public, making privatized enterprises pub-
licly held companies. As a result, the first necessary condition
for the creation of a securities market in Kazakhstan-the
existence of issuers of securities-has been satisfied.
27. See id. para. 26.
28. See James Kynge, Kazakhstan Plans Privatization, Stock Market, Reuter
Textline, Mar. 14, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Txtnws File.
29. See id.
30. See U.S. Embassy Report, supra note 12, para. 28.
31. See id.
32. See Kynge, supra note 28.
33. See U.S. Embassy Report, supra note 12, para. 29.
34. See Kazakhstan: Privatization Does Not Solve Economic Problems, Reuter
Textline, Oct. 1, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Txtnws File.
35. See id.
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B. Financial Intermediaries
Measured by the standards of a developed securities mar-
ket, the system of financial intermediation is virtually non-
existent in Kazakhstan. Nevertheless, the securities industry
in the country is growing steadily and is developing the exper-
tise and sophistication necessary to facilitate a market in secu-
rities. Initially, two stock exchanges were created in
Kazakhstan: the Almaty and the Kazakh Stock Exchanges.36
For purposes of economy of scale and most efficient pricing and
liquidity, the drafters of the Kazakhstani securities laws sug-
gested that Kazakhstan have only one stock exchange.3 7 As a
result, both stock exchanges were merged into one Kazakh
Stock Exchange. Thus, Kazakhstan has created a marketplace
for securities trading.
Although the Kazakh Stock Exchange can hardly be com-
pared to the New York or London Stock Exchanges, its floor
maintains some trading activities. The members of the Kazakh
Stock Exchange trade mostly in short-term debt instruments
known as veksels or bills of exchange.38 Bills of exchange are
currently in use in Kazakhstan and their use is growing be-
cause these instruments secure the underlying assets of privat-
ized enterprises. 9 Owing to their extensive use in privatiza-
tion, bills of exchange are traded very actively.4"
With respect to the active trading in bills of exchange, the
Kazakhstani experience is not unique. In the 1950s and 1960s
in Brazil, an accelerated rate of inflation boosted the develop-
ment of a public market in bills of exchange.41 This market
had an enormous impact on the Brazilian capital markets; it
created, for the first time, "the nucleus of a securities indus-
36. Interview with Mark Berger, Member of the U.S. Team of Drafters of
Kazakhstani Securities Laws, in New York, N.Y. (Feb. 1996) [hereinafter Berger
Interview].
37. See Structure of a Secondary Market in Kazakhstan, INTRADOS (Int'l Mgmt.
Group, Almaty, Kazakhstan) (1995) [hereinafter Structure of a Secondary Market]
(on file with the Brooklyn Journal of International Law).
38. Berger Interview, supra note 36.
39. See Memorandum from Greg Vojack to Babak Movaheidi (Oct. 17, 1994)
[hereinafter Vojack Memorandum on Veksels] (on file with the Brooklyn Journal of
International Law).
40. See id.
41. See Norman S. Poser, Securities Regulation in Developing Countries: The
Brazilian Experience, 52 VA. L. REv. 1283, 1289 (1966).
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try."42 Similarly, active trading in bills of exchange in
Kazakhstan helps Kazakhstani securities professionals develop
invaluable experience, which may later be used in securities
trading.
While Kazakhstani broker-dealers have learned the basics
of securities trading through their participation in the bills of
exchange market, the wide use of investment funds in the
Kazakhstani privatization program has brought investment
advisors and portfolio managers into existence. These catego-
ries of securities professionals learn their trade in a process of
managing the investment finds that bid for newly privatized
enterprises. Even though these managers of Kazakhstani in-
vestment funds, unlike their Western counterparts, do not
have to deal with all the complexities of modern investment
strategies, their primary task of composing a financially sound
investment portfolio is basically the same as that of the man-
ager of Vanguard or Fidelity.
As this brief overview of the Kazakhstani securities indus-
try indicates, Kazakhstani financial institutions are already
capable of handling simple tasks associated with securities
trading. Furthermore, the Kazakhstani securities industry has
received assistance from its more experienced Western col-
leagues. In 1992, the Kazakhstani government hired the
Rothschild Group as investment advisors to the country on the
development of its natural resources, privatization of its indus-
tries, creation of its capital markets, and promotion of securi-
ties underwriting.4" One of the tasks delegated to the
Rothschild Group is advising Kazakhstani enterprises on cor-
porate finance, commercial credit, and investment banking.'
Such "tutoring" of Kazakhstani securities professionals by a
prominent Western banker, aided by economic conditions of the
Kazakhstani market, gives Kazakhstani financial institutions
a practical experience in dealing with securities and facilitates
the development of a securities industry in Kazakhstan.
In sum, the Kazakhstani securities industry is not simply
an ambitious dream of the Kazakhstani government, it is be-
42. Id.
43. See Kasakhstan [sic] Signs Agreement with Rothschild Group to Advise on
Development of Its Natural Resources and Privatization of Its Industries, PR
Newswire, May 21, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File.
44. See id.
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coming an economic reality. As it develops its expertise
through trading in short-term instruments and participation in
the privatization of investment funds, the industry provides a
viable system for bringing together buyers and sellers of secu-
rities, thus satisfying the second condition necessary for the
creation of a securities market.
C. Investors
The privatization of state-controlled enterprises has creat-
ed widespread share ownership in Kazakhstan.45 As a result,
the nation has witnessed the rise of a class of domestic inves-
tors who may be willing to trade their shares. Furthermore,
the investment funds, which are structured in a way very
similar to that of mutual funds, will most likely trade in pri-
vatized stock to create marketable investment portfolios.
The appearance of domestic investors on the Kazakhstani
market is certainly relevant to the creation of a securities
market. However, there is no guarantee that the owners of
privatized shares in Kazakhstan will trade them instead of
holding these shares in the hope of overcoming inflation. More-
over, domestic investors that may exist in Kazakhstan do not
have enough savings to compensate for a lack of foreign capital
injections. As to the individual foreign investors who do not
have the ability to obtain adequate information about
Kazakhstani companies, the Kazakhstani market is too dan-
gerous for them. Therefore, the existence of a securities market
in Kazakhstan depends on whether global institutional inves-
tors will be willing to invest in it.
A number of factors indicate that the Kazakhstani market
is capable of attracting such global institutional investors. In
the past three decades, the world's securities markets have
undergone the process of internationalization." Global inves-
tors have been looking for new markets to diversify their port-
folios and to obtain higher rates of return." To that end, more
45. See supra text accompanying notes 34-35.
46. See Internationalization of the Securities Markets, Exchange Act. Rel. No.
21,958, [1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) a 83,759 (Apr. 18, 1985).
47. "[D]uring the years spanning 1980 to 1989, total U.S. purchases and sales
of securities abroad grew from $17.9 billion to $230.3 billion." Joseph A.
Grundfest, Internationalization of the World's Securities Markets: Economic Causes
and Regulatory Consequences, 4 J. FIN. SERvs. RES. 349, 357 (1990).
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and more investors have turned their eyes toward the emerg-
ing markets, a terra incognita that offers rich rewards to in-
trepid financial conquistadors of the twentieth century who
defy the risks of the unknown.48 Given the interest in the
emerging markets on the part of the global institutional inves-
tors, the Kazakhstani market may well become their next
investment target. In order to support this proposition, the
following discussion of emerging markets in general is offered.
1. Emerging Markets
Although emerging markets encompass a variety of differ-
ent economic systems, they all share certain common features.
An emerging market is a market that: (1) has securities that
trade in a public market; (2) is not a developed market (as
defined by countries covered within the Morgan Stanley Capi-
tal International Indices or Financial Times Indices); (3) is of
interest to global institutional investors; and (4) has a reliable
source of data.49 Most economists agree that investing in
emerging markets increases both the returns and-contrary to
common perceptions-the safety of the portfolio." A study by
economists Divecha, Drach, and Stefek found that a global
investor who, over the five-year period studied, invested 20%
in an emerging markets index fund, would have reduced over-
all annual portfolio risk from 18.3% to 17.5% while increasing
annual return from 12.6% to 14.7%."'
A few factors contribute to this rather unexpected result.
First, while the emerging markets are more volatile than the
developed markets, they tend to be relatively uncorrelated with
each other and other developed markets.52 For example, in
October, 1987, while the world's markets were crashing, the
48. Although U.S. stocks produced returns averaging 27% in 1995, some ana-
lysts believe that many foreign markets, and emerging markets in particular, will
outperform the markets in the United States over the next 18 months. See Mark
Bautz, Where in the World to Invest Now, MONEY, Oct. 1995, at 138, 139. More-
over, over the period from 1987 to 1991, the International Finance Corporations
Emerging Markets Composite Index was 19.7%, as compared to 12.6% for the
Financial Times World Index. See Arjun B. Divecha et al., Emerging Markets: A
Quantitative Perspective, J. PORTFOLIO MGmT., Fall 1992, at 41, 42.
49. See Divecha et al., supra note 48, at 42.
50. See id. at 41.
51. Id.
52. See id.
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Indian stock market was up modestly.53 This low correlation
can be explained by the fact that most of the emerging mar-
kets have closed economies whose ties with the world markets
are very weak.'
Homogeneity within an emerging market is another impor-
tant factor contributing to the reduction of risk of the portfolio
that contains emerging-markets investments. In other words,
when the market moves, there is a strong tendency for all
stocks in the market to move with it.55 This phenomenon oc-
curs in part due to a high market concentration where a few
large companies so dominate the market that they are, in
effect, the market." Thus, if an emerging market moves up or
down, all stocks in the market will probably move in the same
direction. From the investor's viewpoint, the homogeneity phe-
nomenon suggests that the investor in emerging markets has
to pick the right market at the right time rather than picking
"good" stocks within a market."
The relatively low cross-market correlation and high mar-
ket homogeneity in the emerging markets offer an opportunity
for diversification and overall portfolio risk reduction.58 The
flip side of low correlations across these markets and high
homogeneity within a market is that country selection becomes
the most important task for a portfolio manager.59 Clearly,
the major consideration in selecting one emerging market over
another is the rate of return it produces."
53. See id. at 48. Numerically, the average correlation among the developed
markets over the five-year period studied was 0.49. See id. The average correlation
among the emerging markets was 0.07 over the same period of time, and 89 out
of 276 correlations were negative. See id. at 47-48. Moreover, the average correla-
tion with the developed markets was negative 0.01 (-0.01). See id. at 49.
54. See id. at 48.
55. See id. at 45. Concentration of the market is calculated by the following
formula:
Concentration = [(N/N - 1) x Y(. - 1/N)9]°5,
where:
N = Total number of stocks or industries, and
h. = Weight in asset (or industry) n.
Based on this formula, the concentration of an extremely diversified market like
the United States is 0.08, whereas the average for the emerging markets of Tai-
wan, Korea, Thailand, and Malaysia is 0.13. See id.
56. See id.
57. See id. at 47.
58. See id. at 50.
59. See id.
60. See id. The high homogeneity of the market allows us to talk about the
[Vol. XXII:3
19971 KAZAKHSTANI SECURITIES REGULATION
Correctly selecting emerging markets indeed pays off. In
1990, the Venezuelan stock market rose about 450% in U.S.
dollar terms."' On the other hand, bad selection can be as
harmful as good selection can be rewarding. For instance, in
1990 the Taiwanese Stock Exchange index began the year at
about the 5,000 level, went up to 12,600 during the first quar-
ter, and then plummeted to near 2,500 during the third quar-
ter.62 These numbers show that emerging markets are ex-
tremely volatile, and it is necessary to form some model to
determine the returns of such markets.63
For that purpose, conventional linear models are not al-
ways workable in application to the emerging markets. Camp-
bell Harvey found in his studies that only one of twenty emerg-
ing markets had a beta greater than one when measured
against a world equity market return," yet common sense
tells us that emerging markets have large risk exposure. The
reason why the beta model fails to describe accurately the
emerging markets is that the beta model operates on the as-
sumption that all capital markets are completely integrated.65
As we have already seen, the emerging markets with the low
cross-market correlation are hardly integrated in the world
economy. Therefore, Erb, Harvey, and Viskanta offered a dif-
ferent model for determining the returns of the emerging mar-
kets, a model based on credit risk ratings.66 This approach
rate of return for the market as a whole, rather than the rate of return of indi-
vidual stocks or industries. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
61. See Divecha et al., supra note 48, at 42.
62. See id.
63. Divecha, Drach, and Stefek measured the returns of emerging markets
using the following model: Excess Return (over the risk-free return) = Currency
Return - Local Excess Return + Cross-Product. See id. at 43. Numerically, this for-
mula looks like the following:
Excess Return = (r. + r. - r,) - (r, - r,) + r. x r,
where r, = the risk-free rate of return in the country of the investor, and r. = the
risk-free rate in the market where the investment is made. See id.
Using this model, the authors concluded that "[tihe overall portion of vari-
ance explained by the emerging markets model (adjusted R) is 50%, as compared
with 38% for a similar model that covers the developed markets (countries covered
by the Financial Times Indices)." Id. at 44.
64. Campbell R. Harvey, Predictable Risk and Returns in Emerging Markets, 8
REV. FIN. STUD. 773, 791 (1995).
65. See Claude B. Erb et al., Country Risk and Global Equity Selection, J.
PORTFOLIO MGM2T., Winter 1995, at 74, 80.
66. Id. at 75.
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gives a better picture of market return because credit risk
ratings consider simultaneously political and other expropria-
tion risks, inflation and exchange rate volatility/controls, the
industrial portfolio and its economic viability, sensitivity to
global economic shocks, and many other factors. 7
The studies conducted by Erb, Harvey, and Viskanta
showed a negative correlation between credit ratings and aver-
age returns." Thus, the highest credit risk countries, with an
average credit risk rating of 33.2, have an average annual
return of 27.3%, annual volatility of 17.1%, and an average
dividend yield of 5.1%.69 At the same time, the low credit risk
countries, with an average rating of 90.2, have an average
annual return of 15.7%, annual volatility of 15.0%, and an
average dividend yield of 3.5%.7" In other words, the riskier
the country is in terms of its credit rating, the higher the re-
turns that can be expected on its market.
In sum, economists have drawn an attractive picture of
investment in the emerging markets. The question remains,
however, whether Kazakhstan qualifies as an emerging market
and hence can offer global investors the same advantages as
the rest of this group. In comparing the features of the
emerging markets discussed above with the peculiarities of the
Kazakhstani economy, this article answers this question in the
affrmative.
Indeed, the application of the emerging markets defini-
tion7' to Kazakhstan indicates that it has a potential to be-
come an emerging market. First; Kazakhstan is certainly not a
developed market. Second, as it has been shown in this article,
Kazakhstan has securities that can be traded in a public mar-
ket.12 As to a reliable source of data, a number of leading ac-
counting and law firms, such as Price Waterhouse, Arthur
67. See id. Another advantage of this model is that credit risk rating, unlike
the traditional risk measurement methods, is forward-looking. In other words, this
model is not based on the past prices of securities, but rather uses the credit
forecast to extrapolate the future development of the market. See id.
68. See id. at 76.
69. See id. at 79 fig.3.
70. See id. The International Finance Corporation data indicates an even wid-
er gap in performance: 34.3% average annual return for the highest credit risk
countries with the average credit rating of 27.2, versus 7.9% annual return for
lowest credit risk countries with the average credit rating of 61.9. See id.
71. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
72. See supra Part IIA-B.
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Andersen, Coopers & Lybrand, and Clifford Chance, have es-
tablished their presence in Kazakhstan." Thus, Kazakhstan
satisfies at least three prongs of the emerging market defini-
tion. But most important, Kazakhstan has the potential to
satisfy the fourth prong of the definition: the country can, and
does, attract the attention of global institutional investors.
2. Rate of Return
The Kazakhstani market can provide high rates of return.
Studies of Kazakhstani economic and political conditions show
that Kazakhstan is a high-credit-risk country. According to the
analysis conducted by the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU),
Kazakhstan scored a rate of 75.74 This number gives a fairly
accurate picture of the country's economy and can serve as a
starting point for calculating the annual return of the
Kazakhstani market. Indeed, the EIU took into consideration
the overall situation in Kazakhstan: the political victory of
President Nursultan Nasarbaev in the August 30, 1995 refer-
endure; 9.2% Gross Domestic Product (GDP); a mass privatiza-
tion program; reduction of inflation rates (2.4% in September
1995, as compared to 9.7% in September 1994); and a slow-
down in the overall decline in industrial production (from
22.4% in January 1995 to 10.8% in August 1995).7 The EIU
Credit Rating Service also considered the fact that Kazakhstan
has a low foreign debt burden. The EIU estimated that by
1997, the debt/GDP ratio will be only 5.4%, with a debt-service
ratio of 8.7%.76
Now, using the model developed by Erb, Harvey, and
Viskanta,"7 we can determine the average annual return. It
73. See Helen Davidson, Kazakhstan: Asian Gateway to Profits, SUN. TIMES
(London), Apr. 16, 1995 available in LEXIS, News Library, Txtnws File.
74. See Kazakhstan Update, Economist Intelligence Unit, Oct. 20, 1995, avail-
able in LEXIS, World Library, Eiunws -File [hereinafter Kazakhstan Update]. It
has to be noted that the EIU credit risk rating uses the opposite scale than the
one used by Erb, Harvey, and Viskanta. See supra notes 66-70 and accompanying
text. The EIU's Country Risk Service ratings range from zero for the least risky
"A" category countries to 100 for the highest risk "E" group. See Ven Sreenivasan,
Asian Economies Except China the Least Risky, Says EIU, Bus. TIMEs, Dec. 20,
1994, at 3, available in LEXIS, News Library, Papers File.
75. See Kazakhstan Update, supra note 74.
76. See id.
77. See supra notes 66-70 and accompanying text.
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should be noted at the outset that Erb, Harvey, and Viskanta
rated each country's credit risk on a scale of zero to 100, with
100 representing the smallest risk of default.78 In contrast,
the EIU's scale is the reverse of that used by Erb, Harvey, and
Viskanta, with the rating of 100 to be the highest credit
risk. 9 Consequently, for purposes of consistency, the EIUs
credit risk number has been adjusted to the Erb-Harvey-
Viskanta model. The resulting rate is thus 25. Using this num-
ber, we can estimate the rate of return for the Kazakhstani
market, by extrapolating the rates of returns of the countries
that have similar credit ratings on the Erb-Harvey-Viskanta
scale.
The countries that will be closest to each other on the
scale will be Pakistan (which is rated by the International
Finance Corporation at 26.4) and Zimbabwe, which is rated at
24.5." The compound annual rates of return for these two
countries are 24.3% and 6.0%, respectively.8 ' These numbers
provide very little help because the spread between their re-
spective returns exceed the spread between the returns of low
and high credit risk countries. Despite an apparent inconsis-
tency with the credit risk investment model, such can be ex-
plained.82 Zimbabwe, unlike many other emerging markets,
has special classes of shares and particularly tight restrictions
on the repatriation of capital.' These restrictions make
Zimbabwe's portfolio not investable and, consequently, of no
interest to global institutional investors, which explains the
low rates of return.'
Thus, Kazakhstan has an option of tightening its foreign
investment policies and significantly lowering market
investability. As a result, Kazakhstan would follow the pattern
of the Zimbabwe market with its 6% annual returns; such a
low return is of no interest to the institutional investors who
can fare much better in U.S. blue chip stocks. Alternatively,
Kazakhstan can create a favorable environment for foreign
investments and become a very attractive emerging market
78. Erb et al., supra note 65, at 75.
79. See Sreenivasan, supra note 74.
80. See Erb et al., supra note 65, at 76-77 fig.1.
81. See id.
82. See id. at 81.
83. See id.
84. See id.
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with a compound annual rate of return of 24%--the rate of
return that, according to Erb, Harvey, and Viskanta studies,
conforms to the credit risk rating similar to that of
Kazakhstan. Certain facts circumstantially indicate that
Kazakhstan is steadily moving in the direction of the second
option. Under the Kazakhstan foreign investment law, foreign
investments can be in the form of stock holdings in
Kazakhstani enterprises and in the form of other securities."
This law guarantees foreign investors the right to transfer
freely abroad the income derived from their activities in
Kazakhstan"5 Furthermore, the law completely rules out any
possibility of expropriations. 7 The law also eliminates dual
taxation, in accordance with tax agreements entered into by
Kazakhstan with other countries,88 and allows international
binding arbitration of commercial disputes.89 Finally, the law
not only gives foreign investors national treatment,0 but also
provides state guarantees for their investments.9' The text of
the law indicates that Kazakhstan chose an open door policy
with respect to foreign investments. Consequently,
Kazakhstan's investment portfolio, unlike that of Zimbabwe,92
is not uninvestable, and unlike the anomalous credit
rate/annual return correlation on the closed Zimbabwe market,
Kazakhstan fits into the model developed by Erb, Harvey, and
85. See Law on Foreign Investments, art. 1, adopted Dec. 27, 1994 (Kaz.),
translated in THE CIVIL CODE OF KAZAKHSTAN 230, 230 (W.E. Butler trans., 1995)
[hereinafter Law on Foreign Investments]. This recently adopted law provides that
"[floreign investments may be contributed to any objects and types of activity not
prohibited for such investments by legislative acts of the Republic Kazakhstan." Id.
art. 2, at 231; see also Vladimir Savin, Kazakhstan: Foreign Investment Legislation,
Reuters, Foreign Trade (USSR), Jan. 1, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Txtnws File.
86. See Law on Foreign Investments, supra note 85, art. 11(2), at 236-37.
87. See id. art. 7, at 235.
88. See Savin, supra note 85. The term "dual taxation" describes a situation
when foreigners doing business in Country A pay taxes on the income earned in
Country A twice: First, in Country A, and then in their home country. Since dual
taxation may impede the development of international trade, many countries try to
avoid it by entering into tax agreements that provide tax credits for income
earned abroad. See id.; see also Law on Foreign Investments, supra note 85, art.
22, at 242.
89. See Law on Foreign Investments, supra note 85, art. 27, at 244-45.
90. See id. art. 4(1), at 232.
91. See id. arts. 5-6, 8, at 233-35.
92. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
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Viskanta.9 3 Therefore, we may assume that the Kazakhstani
market can generate substantial annual returns in the range
of 24%, similar to other emerging markets, with the same
credit risk ratings, surveyed by Erb, Harvey, and Viskanta.
This point of view is supported by some investment fund
managers. As of April 1995, two English investment funds,
Framlington and Flemings, were about to launch the first
funds to invest in Kazakhstan. 4 Framlington has presented
to institutional investors a fund that aims to invest between
US$30 to $40 million dollars in Kazakhstan.95 Peter Phelps,
the director of Framlington's Central Asia desk, has said that
"[firom an investment perspective, Kazakhstan is reasonably
attractive.... Politically, the region is fundamentally stable
although they may not win brownie points for democracy."96
In contrast, Flemings has set up a Kazakhstan equity fund
aimed at small investors. 7 According to the fund manager,
James Oates, "Bearing in mind the risks, we believe that there
is value in Kazakhstan.... The big story is oil and gas, and
the presence of such high-profile investors as Chevron
helps."8
The discussion of investment opportunities in Kazakhstan
leads to the conclusion that its market is attractive to both
foreign and domestic investors. The wide-scale investment
93. See supra notes 66-70 and accompanying text.
94. See Davidson, supra note 73.
95. See id.
96. Id. The country is considered politically stable by Western businessmen
interested in the Kazakhstani market, even though on March 11, 1995, President
Nasarbaev dissolved the Parliament. See Douglas Busvine, Kazakhstan: Foreign
Investors Relaxed About Kazakhstan, Reuter Textline, Mar. 13, 1995, available in
LEXIS, Wires Library, Txtee File. But see infra note 147. According to Bob Wil-
liams, one of the officers of Tengizchevroil, a joint venture between Kazakhstan
and Chevron Oil, there is no reason for foreign investors to feel insecure since all
the agreements and licenses remained in effect. See Busvine, supra. Moreover, the
U.S. Ambassador in Kazakhstan, William Courtney, felt that the developments
could even help reinforce the rule of law in Kazakhstan after the Kazakhstani
Constitutional Court ruled that the March 1994 elections were undemocratic. See
id.
97. See Davidson, supra note 73.
98. Id. Chevron has a 50% stake in Tengiz, the world's single biggest oil
deposit, which is capable of producing 750,000 barrels of crude oil a day. See
Busvine, supra note 96. Chevron has already spent about US$1 billion in Tengiz.
See Andrew Higgins, Kazakhstan: Russia's Pipe Dreams Fuel Oil Rush on Caspian
Sea, Reuter Textline, May 18, 1995, available in LEXIS, Wires Library, Txtwe
File.
554 [Vol. XXI:3
19971 KAZAKHSTANI SECURITIES REGULATION
potential of the Kazakhstani market may be summarized in
the words of Noel Jones, English ambassador to Kazakhstan:
"Theoretically it's an open door. Potentially, it's going to be
very profitable... ."" Thus, the third economic condition to
the creation of a securities market-the presence of investors
who may be willing to invest in Kazakhstani securities-has
been satisfied.
D. State Interest
At the beginning of the article, it was stated that the cre-
ation of a securities market depends upon the existence of
three groups of players in the national economy: issuers of
securities, financial intermediaries, and investors. The focus
now is on the fourth player-the government-which has the
power to create or reject the securities market. From the
government's perspective, a securities market raises two is-
sues: First, whether a country needs such a market; and sec-
ond, even if the country does need such a market, whether it
should be regulated by the government. While regulatory is-
sues of the Kazakhstani securities market are discussed in
Part III of this article, this part will discuss Kazakhstan's
economic interest in a securities market.
The Kazakhstani government appears to favor the creation
of a securities market,00 and, considering the state of affairs
in the national economy and all the alternatives to the securi-
ties market, such a favorable attitude is justified. Given the
national goal of raising capital for economic reforms,
Kazakhstan has three major ways to do so: (1) through the
direct "sale" of national equity to a few mega-corporations like
Chevron;' (2) through loans from commercial banks; and (3)
by introducing a viable securities market. While the correct
99. Davidson, supra note 73.
100. The creation of a securities market has been endorsed by President
Nasarbaev and, with minor exceptions, by the Kazakhstani Council of Ministers.
Berger Interview, supra note 36.
101. The direct investments can also be made by investment companies or
venture capital firms. However, investments by investment companies presume the
existence of a securities market. On the other hand, given the risks of direct in-
vestments in the Kazakhstani economy, venture capital firms investing in
Kazakhstan either have to be very large (which makes them no different from
mega-corporations) or their role in capital raising on the national level would be
negligible.
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combination of all three methods should give the best results,
the exclusion of a securities market from a capital-raising
process could seriously damage the economy.
Consider first the direct equity investment by a few multi-
national corporations. This capital-raising mechanism has a
number of major shortcomings. From the Kazakhstani perspec-
tive, such direct investment may be perceived by the general
population as a "western takeover.""2 Like most of the other
former Soviet Republics that were literally enslaved by the
Communist Moloch, °3 Kazakhstan is very sensitive to na-
tional independence. Excessive economic power of multination-
al corporations over the Kazakhstani economy will allow con-
servative parties to play a nationalist card against the govern-
ment, thus increasing instability in the country. From the
international perspective, Kazakhstan, which has almost no
antitrust system, is too susceptible to the monopolization of its
economy.'" As a result, vast oil and gold resources of
Kazakhstan easily can be taken over by a powerful concern,
which then would be able to affect the world market for these
commodities.' These problems are less pressing if equity
ownership in the Kazakhstani economy is distributed through
the securities market, which consists mostly of passive inves-
tors.
06
If excessive power of corporate giants raises antitrust and
competition concerns, borrowing from commercial banks con-
tains other perils no less detrimental to the economy. As
102. As noted previously, the Law on Foreign Investments does not limit for-
eign participation in Kazakhstani enterprises. See supra notes 86-91 and accompa-
nying text. Therefore, it is possible that an enterprise would be fully controlled by
foreigners.
103. Moloch was one of the Babylonian gods whose cult involved human sacri-
fice.
104. Article 11 of the Civil Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan outlaws
anticompetitive practices. See CIVIL CODE, art. 11, translated in THE CIVIL CODE
OF KAZAKHSTAN, supra note 85, at 29, 36 [hereinafter CIVIL CODE]. However, the
law came into effect only in December of 1994, and it is unlikely that Kazakhstan
has developed strong antitrust structures.
105. Indeed, Tengiz oilfield, with its daily production capacity of 750,000 bar-
rels, see Higgins, supra note 98, can seriously affect the price of oil on the world
market. The same is true for Kazakhstani gold mines.
106. For the purposes of this article, I assume that securities markets are not
used for corporate takeovers and buyouts. Although in reality this is not true, the
issues raised by legislation similar to the United States Williams Act are outside
the scope of this paper.
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Macey and Miller have stated, "While placing banks in posi-
tions of exceptional power over their borrowers may be optimal
for banks, it may not be optimal for the rest of society."0 7
Since debt holders, as opposed to equity holders, have a fixed
claim against a company, they are inimical to any risk-taking
by the company even if such risk-taking may benefit the com-
pany and ultimately increase the equity.' If the debt is
raised through the securities markets, the only way bondhold-
ers can affect the corporate decision-making process is through
restrictive covenants in the indenture. In contrast, an expan-
sion of direct lending by commercial banks as the only means
of capital raising gives the banks a dominant position in the
corporate governance system.' 9 Consequently, the banks may
use their dominant power over the corporate governance to
prevent companies from undertaking risky projects."0 Given
the fact that the Kazakhstani economy is struggling through a
transition period, risk-taking is an inherent part of the nation's
economic development. In this situation, risk-averse lenders
with excessive power over their borrowers can undermine the
very process of transition to the market economy.
As follows from a comparison of direct equity investments,
commercial lending and a securities market, the securities
market appears to be the most robust and advantageous form
of capital raising. It generally does not raise antitrust concerns
and does not lead to the allocative inefficiency of corporate
governance. Therefore, there is no reason that Kazakhstan
should forego this very effective capital-raising mechanism.
In addition to the economic benefits associated with a
securities market, the market has an ability to promote social
policies brought into existence by the privatization of the
Kazakhstani economy. The creation of share ownership has
been designed to introduce a new capitalist culture to the gen-
eral population of the country."' According to Max Weber,
107. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Corporate Governance and Com-
mercial Banking: A Comparative Examination of Germany, Japan, and the United
States, 48 STAN. L. REV. 73, 96 (1995).
108. See id.
109. See id. Germany and Japan are examples of such a system. See id.
110. See id.
111. See, e.g., ROMAN FRYDMAN & ANDRZEJ RAPACZYNSKI, PRIVATIZATION IN
EASTERN EUROPE: IS THE STATE WITHERING AwAY? 10 (1994). Frydman and
Rapaczynski note: "[T]he privatization process in Eastern Europe... is not a
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the spirit of capitalism "is identical with the pursuit of profit,
and forever renewed profit, by means of continuous, rational,
capitalist enterprise.""2  Applying this definition to
shareowners, Saunders and Harris suggested that sharehold-
ers who are newly converted to capitalism must realize two
things. On the one hand, they should understand that,
unlike regular savings, shares are not risk-free invest-
ments." On the other hand, shareholding should not be per-
ceived as a kind of gambling that can bring dramatic gains or
tragic losses." 5 Only by realizing both aspects of share own-
ership can a population develop a real capitalist spirit and
become "investors" rather than "savers" or "gamblers."
Analyzing the British experience in privatization,
Saunders and Harris concluded that privatization attracted
"gamblers" and "savers" as much as "investors.""' Moreover,
the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) survey found that
"many shareholders [of privatized British enterprises] still
have little experience of how to trade in shares. Asked where
they would seek guidance on where to buy shares, 54% could
not answer.""7 Thus, Saunders and Harris concluded that
privatization itself does not create "capitalist enterprising
individuals;" rather, "[tihe inspirational dream of creating a
nation of shareowners has in part been realized, but nobody
noticed any difference. Sociologically, the great privatization
crusade has turned out to be much ado about nothing.""
8
If privatization in Great Britain, a country with highly
developed capitalist institutions, did little to develop a sense of
capitalism in the general population, not much more can be
expected from the general population of Kazakhstan, which
was taught for generations to live up to socialist standards.
simple transfer of ownership from the state to private individuals. It is rather a
process by which the very institution of property, in the sense in which lawyers
and economists employ the term, is reintroduced into East European societies." Id.
112. MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM 17
(Talcott Parsons trans., Harper Collins Academic 1991) (1930).
113. PETER SAUNDERS & COLIN HARRIS, PRIVATIZATION AND POPULAR CAPITAL-
ISM 154 (1994).
114. See id.
115. See id.
116. See id. at 155.
117. Id. at 156 (citing G. Oldham, TAURUS and the Private Shareholder, 11
ECON. AFF. 14-20 (1990)).
118. Id. at 162.
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The majority of the Kazakh population can probably be catego-
rized as "savers," whose distrust in rapidly devaluating money
prompted their decision to invest in shares of privatized enter-
prises."' There is certainly a group of "gamblers," for gam-
blers exist in any society. But most definitely, the number of
real "investors" in Kazakhstani population is negligible.
Under such circumstances, the major goal of privatiza-
tion-transition to a market economy-cannot be achieved
without developing in the general population a capitalist spirit
and understanding of values that come along with share own-
ership. In turn, the task of educating the population about
capitalism and a market economy can be fulfilled by the intro-
duction of securities markets, where market forces transform
the meaningless price tags attached to the state-distributed
vouchers into shares that have true market value. Thus, the
social success of privatization is closely tied to the creation of a
securities market. From that perspective, Kazakhstan's dilem-
ma is not whether to have or not to have a securities market;
rather, Kazakhstan's dilemma is whether to regulate securities
trading, and if so, to what extent so that the regulation will
successfully jump-start a viable securities market.
III. LEGAL ASPECTS OF KAZAKHSTANI "SECURITIZATION"
A. The Need for Securities Regulation in Kazakhstan
As Part II of this article indicates, Kazakhstan has all the
prerequisites of an emerging securities market and, most im-
portantly, has a large float of stocks created in the course of a
comprehensive privatization program. All of this means that
Kazakhstan already has primitive securities trading, which
will only develop further with the progress of the privatization
program. In this situation, the Kazakhstani government can
either permit such a market to develop freely or it can impose
a set of regulations on the emerging securities industry. By
adopting the Securities Decree, 20 Kazakhstan has chosen a
regulatory approach to the securities market. It appears that a
119. As Deputy Prime-Minister Karibzhanov succinctly put it when explaining
the desire of the general population of Kazakhstan to invest their savings in
something tangible: "Even though prices may change, a bottle of vodka will always
be worth a bottle of vodka." Kynge, supra note 28.
120. See infra Part III.B.
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comprehensive regulation of the securities market is the only
way to assure its proper functioning.
Some have suggested that securities markets in the former
communist countries should develop freely, without enacting
inhibiting regulation in the first instance. 2' This argument is
supported by the free marketeers of the Chicago School of
Economics."' According to their views, "if companies publish
misleading corporate information, that is a sign that there is
little demand for accurate information and that regulatory
requirements are unnecessary .... "' If, on the other hand,
there is a strong demand for accurate information, companies
will compete with each other to provide as much accurate in-
formation as possible for investors." This notion, however,
does not explain why the recurrence of fraudulent practices
and market manipulation is so frequent in the securities in-
dustry. It also conflicts with the basic premises of securities
laws that:
[Slecurities are inherently "intricate merchandise"; that the
peculiar complexities of the securities markets are beyond the
common experience or understanding of most public inves-
tors; and that a special regulatory agency is needed to pro-
vide protection for investors and the public interest."
Thus, world experience shows that securities regulation is
necessary in order to prevent abuses and foster markets that
merit and retain investor confidence." 6
In the context of emerging markets in general and
Kazakhstan in particular, the market-regulating-market theo-
ry is even less workable than in the developed securities mar-
kets. The Kazakhstani market, which has not yet developed
traditions of disclosure, can hardly be described as an efficient
121. See William J. Williams, Jr., Securities Regulation in Emerging Capital
Markets, in INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES MARKETS 1991, at 213, 216 (PLI Corp. L.
& Practice Course Handbook Series No. 743, 1991).
122. See NoImAN S. POSER, INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES REGULATION: LONDON'S
"BIG BANG" AND THE EUROPEAN SECURITIES MARIETS § 1.2, at 5 (1991).
123. Id.
124. See id.
125. Id. at 6 (quoting Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate
Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong. 72 (1987) (summary
statement of Milton H. Cohen, Partner, Schiff, Hardin & Waite)).
126. See id.
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market. Moreover, the general public in Kazakhstan lacks an
investment culture to determine what information is necessary
to assess the price of a stock. Under such circumstances, newly
created joint-stock companies have every incentive to draw a
rosy picture of their conditions and to omit all negative infor-
mation, knowing that the investing public will never be able to
discover the truth. As a result, the general public, both domes-
tic and foreign, will abandon the market, leaving it to a few big
players who have the power to retrieve all necessary informa-
tion from the companies. The exclusion of the general pub-
lic-namely, foreign investors-from the securities market may
reduce the flow of capital to Kazakhstani enterprises and even-
tually slow down the development of the Kazakhstani econo-
my.
In addition to the existence of fraudulent practices of mis-
representation and nondisclosure, an unregulated securities
market creates ample opportunities for market manipulation
by industry professionals who possess a superior knowledge of
the market. The U.S. securities market as it existed before the
enactment of federal securities laws is a good example of what
might happen in the absence of government regulation of the
industry. 2 7
In the United States in the nineteenth century, a substan-
tial portion of the public was not accustomed to investing in
shares of stock 8 and the issuers of securities did not have
large capitalization. 9 Under such circumstances, the market
was dominated by the pools of speculators known as "bulls"
and "bears."8 o Bears sold stocks short, hoping that the mar-
ket price would go down, whereas bulls tried to "corner" the
stock in order to force the bears to buy this stock from the
bulls at a higher price.' In order to achieve their goals, mar-
ket speculators used all kinds of deceit to assure that the com-
127. For an account of manipulative practices by the U.S. securities industry
before the enactment of federal securities laws, see NORMAN S. POSER, BROKER-
DEALER LAW AND REGULATION: PRIVATE RIGHTS OF ACTION § 3.5.1, at 335-44
(1995).
128. See id at 336 & n.3 (citing VINCENT CAROSSO, INVESTMENT BANKING IN
AMERICA 14-16 (1970)).
129. See id. at 336.
130. Id.
131. See id.
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peting pool was unaware of the operation."3 2 When the twen-
tieth century and World War I brought an inexperienced gen-
eral public into the market, bears and bulls had easy prey for
their machinations.' 3 The general public was cheated out of
its money through the use of various devices that created a
"price mirage," which lured outsiders into the market to their
detriment." Such devices included wash sales (when a ma-
nipulator gave an order to buy stock to one broker and an
order to sell stock at the same time to another broker),
matched sales (when a manipulator traded with an accomplice
for the purpose of creating an appearance of market activity),
and injection of false information into the market.'
All these manipulative practices existed, despite the fact
that spreading false information was considered a fraud under
common law;3 6 wash sales were grounds for expulsion from
the New York Stock Exchange 37 as well as criminal prosecu-
tion under the New York anti-fraud statute.3 8 It took the
U.S. Congress' enactment of sections 9(a) and 10(b) of the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934' to effectively fight these ac-
tivities practiced by "prominent businessmen and national
figures of both political parties."40
With respect to opportunities to manipulate the market,
the situation in Kazakhstan is even worse than that of the
United States at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning
of the twentieth centuries. Unlike the United States, where
securities markets had arisen out of an already existing capi-
talist system, Kazakhstan has artificially introduced the con-
cepts of capitalism and free market into the economy. Further-
132. See id.
133. See id. at 337.
134. Id. at 338.
135. See id. at 339-40.
136. See, e.g., Bedford v. Bagshaw, 157 Eng. Rep. 951 (Ex. 1859) (awarding
damages for false representations to the London Stock Exchange); People v. Feder-
ated Radio Corp., 244 N.Y. 33, 154 N.E. 655 (1926) (criminal prosecution for
"fraudulent practice" of issuing worthless securities through misleading advertis-
ing).
137. See POSER, supra note 127, § 3.5.1, at 343 (quoting JOHN J. DILLON,
HIND-SIGHTS OR LOOKING BAcKwARD AT SwINDLEs 62 (1911)).
138. See People v. Rice, 221 A.D. 443, 223 N.Y.S. 566 (1st Dep't 1927).
139. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i(a), 78j(b) (1994).
140. POSER, supra note 127, § 3.5.2, at 344 (quoting CAROSSO, supra note 128,
at 324-25).
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more, the Kazakhstani securities industry does not have any
system of self-regulation. Finally, the Kazakhstani securities
industry, unlike its American predecessor, does not have to
reinvent the wheel and can use the manipulative devices devel-
oped to the highest sophistication by others. As the experience
shows, the only way Kazakhstan may be able to limit market
manipulation and other fraudulent practices is through laws
that provide for vigorous and effective regulation of the securi-
ties market.
The argument for regulation of the securities market is
also supported by the experience of other developing countries
that have introduced securities regulation into their economies.
For instance, in Brazil, where the securities regulation has
been designed to develop and build the markets, stock prices
rose by 139% immediately after the enactment of the Brazilian
securities law.' As Professor Poser noted, "Brazilian inves-
tors and financial firms regarded the statute as a crucial posi-
tive factor, since it indicated a decision by the government to
aid in the development of the markets." If prior experience
is any indication, the enactment of securities regulation in
Kazakhstan should also boost the market and increase the
confidence of market participants.
In the examination of Kazakhstani securities laws, it must
always be noted that despite the apparent similarities in the
structure of securities regulation in the former communist
countries and the Western world, securities regulation in the
latter pursues somewhat different goals. In such countries as
the United States and England, government regulation of secu-
rities traditionally has been adopted in response to abuses that
had occurred in already-existing markets, and has been
amended from time to time to meet the demands of a changing
market. As some commentators noted, in Western economies
"the regulatory activity of the government does not follow some
abstract and predetermined rules, but is basically reactive to
the situation in the market, both in terms of the content of
regulation and the process by which they are promulgat-
ed." Thus, traditional securities regulation can be charac-
141. See Poser, supra note 41, at 1292.
142. Id.
143. FRYDMAN & RAPACZYNSKI, supra note 111, at 172.
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terized as responsive, for it follows and responds to market
trends.
Securities regulation in Kazakhstan and other former
communist countries is being developed for the purpose of
creating an orderly securities market out of chaotic trading in
securities. Unlike "responsive" securities regulation, as it exists
in the United States and other traditional centers of the secu-
rities industry, the governments of former communist countries
have to anticipate the market in order to move it in the right
direction by legislative and regulatory means. This anticipato-
ry character of securities regulation certainly affects its under-
lying philosophy.
Even though securities regulation in Kazakhstan is largely
patterned after the U.S. securities laws, the process of enacting
regulation should be anything but a mere copy of the U.S.
regulatory scheme. Many provisions of the U.S. securities laws
can be used in the Kazakhstani regulatory scheme, but only
because these provisions target the same abuses that can be
expected on the Kazakhstani market. The philosophical differ-
ence in the regulatory schemes in the United States and
Kazakhstan can be seen in the rigidity of regulation. For safety
reasons, anticipatory regulation is always stricter than respon-
sive regulation. Responsive regulation, which has the benefit of
empirical knowledge of the market, may exempt certain eco-
nomic activities from its purview. In contrast, anticipatory
regulation, which, in a way, is a shot in the dark, must try to
encompass as many activities as possible just to assure that
nothing is omitted.
This difference in philosophy is clearly seen in the follow-
ing comparison of U.S. securities laws and the Kazakhstani
regulatory scheme. Securities regulation in Kazakhstan has
few, if any, exemptions. The discussion of the Investment Com-
pany Law also shows another aspect of the difference between
responsive and anticipatory securities regulation. When com-
paring the U.S. regulatory scheme, which may be used as an
example of responsive regulation, with anticipatory securities
regulation in Kazakhstan, it appears that the latter tends to
impose more substantive restrictions, in addition to the disclo-
sure requirements.'
144. See discussion infra Part III.B.2, III.C.
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Due to the anticipatory nature of the regulation, any omis-
sions that can be found in the Kazakhstani scheme may prove
particularly damaging. U.S. securities regulators can justify
non-inclusion of certain restrictions and liabilities in the secu-
rities laws on the basis of empirical studies of the market. In
contrast, Kazakhstani securities regulators labor under a com-
plete uncertainty as to the future of the Kazakhstani securities
market. Moreover, as described earlier, the ability of the
Kazakhstani securities industry to promptly develop an "exper-
tise" in securities fraud eliminates the possibility of a "wait
and see" approach to securities regulation. To that end, there
is no reason for Kazakhstan not to include something that has
proven to be workable in other securities markets, where the
goal of the Kazakhstani regulation is to anticipate and trigger
the creation of the market.
This is not to say that Kazakhstani regulators should
include all provisions of the U.S securities laws that have
proven to be workable in the U.S. market, however complex
and technical they may be. It will be years before the
Kazakhstani market will be able to match, even remotely, the
scale and sophistication of the U.S. market. As Professor Poser
noted in his study of Brazilian securities regulation, which
regulation was enacted to develop the capital markets in Bra-
zil, "[t]he regulatory measures, if too far ahead of generally
accepted standards, may inhibit rather than further market
development." 5 Therefore, overly zealous regulation will
have the counter-effect of scaring off industry professionals,
and will ultimately destroy the market even before it is creat-
ed. This is another aspect that distinguishes an anticipatory
regulation from a responsive one: the proper balance between
investor protection and favorable market conditions should be
anticipated rather than deduced from market studies.
This paper does not attempt to suggest a clear-cut solution
for striking the right balance in anticipatory regulation, partly
because there may not be one. Rather, it tries to survey the
Kazakhstani regulatory scheme in comparison to the U.S.
securities regulation scheme. It is hoped that this survey will
be useful in helping us decide how close the drafters of
Kazakhstani securities laws come to the ideal anticipatory
145. Poser, supra note 41, at 1294.
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regulation, which would transform unorganized securities
trading into an orderly and attractive securities market.
B. The Kazakhstan Securities Decree and Its Enforcement
On April 21, 1995, the President of the Republic of
Kazakhstan issued the Decree on Securities and Stock Ex-
changes (the Decree or Securities Decree).4 s This Decree is
now the highest law on securities in Kazakhstan and, given
the recent parliamentary crisis in the republic,47 political ob-
servers do not anticipate a parliamentary law on securities in
the near future.' The Decree was drafted with the assis-
tance of a team of U.S. attorneys hired for this purpose by US
AID."'49 Consequently, the Decree is founded on the principles
underlying the U.S. securities laws, adjusted for local condi-
tions. The resemblance to U.S. securities laws facilitates the
discussion of the Decree and its comparison to the U.S. scheme
of securities regulation.
Given the main goal of Kazakhstani securities regula-
tion-namely, to develop an orderly securities market out of
the existing primitive securities trading-a number of areas
covered by the Decree merit special attention. Regulation of
companies through the disclosure and registration require-
ments helps increase the efficiency of the Kazakhstani market.
In addition, it helps reduce opportunities for the over-issue and
counterfeiting of securities through the establishment of a
national securities registry. Regulation of industry profession-
146. Decree of the Republic of Kazakhstan President Having the Force of Law
on Securities and Stock-Exchanges (Apr. 21, 1995) [hereinafter Securities Decree]
(official English text on file with the Brooklyn Journal of International Law).
147. In March 1995, President Nasarbaev dissolved the Parliament of
Kazakhstan. See supra note 96. However, in late 1995, the president issued an
executive decree reconvening Parliament. See Ukaz Presidenta Respubliki
Kazakstan imeyushi silu Zakona 0 Parlamente Respubliki Kazakstan I Statuse
Ego Deputatov [Decree of the President of Kazakhstan Having the Force of Law
Concerning the Parliament of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Status of Its
Members] (Oct. 16, 1995). As of early 1997, the Parliament has not enacted any
new securities laws, and thus the Securities Decree remains in full effect.
148. See James B. Varanese, Kazakh President Issues a Comprehensive Decree
on the Securities Market, Russ. & COMiONWEALTH BUS. L. REP., May 24, 1995, at
3.
149. Berger Interview, supra note 36. The project was called US AID, Capital
Markets Consortium, Republic of Kazakhstan, Securities Commission Policy Team.
Id.
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als is designed to assure their honesty and fitness for dealing
in securities. Finally, both governmental and private enforce-
ment of the securities laws in Kazakhstan is necessary to give
bite to its securities regulation. These areas are discussed in
greater detail, following a discussion of the scope of the
Kazakhstani Securities Decree.
1. Scope of the Decree
As is clear from its title, the Decree regulates transactions
in securities. Article 5 of the Decree defines securities as
stocks, bonds, bank certificates, veksels (bills of exchange), and
other types of securities so defined by the decisions of the Na-
tional Commission on Securities. 5 ' The definition of "securi-
ty" under the Decree differs from those under the U.S. securi-
ties laws. Generally, short-term notes are excluded from the
definition of security under U.S. securities laws.'5' In con-
trast, the Decree includes short-term debt instruments, such as
bills of exchange, in the definition of security.'52 The broader
definition of security reflects local realities of the market. Bills
of exchange are currently in use in Kazakhstan, and their use
is growing because these instruments secure the underlying
assets of privatized enterprises.'53 Due to their extensive use
in privatization, bills of exchange are actively traded on the
stock market,'M and therefore are included in the definition
of security.
However, what is missing from the definition of security
under the Decree are so-called investment contracts.55 As
interpreted in a landmark U.S. Supreme Court decision, SEC
150. Securities Decree, supra note 146, art. 5.
151. For instance, the Securities Act of 1933 exempts from registration require-
ments any notes, drafts or bills of exchange which have a maturity of fewer than
nine months. See Securities Act of 1933 § 3(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(3) (1994).
Similarly, § 3(a)(10) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 excludes these instru-
ments from the definition of "security." See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10). Courts in the
United States have consistently interpreted the definitions in the two acts as iden-
tical. See, e.g., Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 61 n.1 (1990) (citing United
Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 847 n.12 (1975)).
152. Securities Decree, supra note 146, art. 5.
153. See Vojack Memorandum on Veksels, supra note 39.
154. See id.
155. See Securities Act of 1933 § 2(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77(b)(1).
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v. W.J. Howey Co.,'56 the investment contract that satisfies
the statutory definition of a security is a contract or transac-
tion whereby a person invests in a common enterprise and is
led to expect profits solely from the efforts of a promoter or a
third party.'57 The "investment contract" definition of security
brings various fraudulent devices within the coverage of securi-
ties laws. The need for the inclusion of the "investment con-
tract" definition in securities regulation can be demonstrated
in the context of a so-called "Ponzi scheme."" 8 While fighting
Ponzi schemes by means of regular anti-fraud rules, such as
common-law fraud, presents a difficult task because of the
sophistication of such schemes and the expertise of their pro-
moters, strict liability for non-registration of a security makes
it easier to defeat this type of fraudulent scheme.
The problem with fraudulent devices like Ponzi schemes is
especially acute in countries of the former Soviet Union, where
the transition to a market economy has brought into existence
all kinds of swindlers eager to defraud inexperienced inves-
tors.'59 The inclusion of "investment contract" in the defini-
tion of "security" in article 5 of the Decree certainly would help
to prevent fraud on the Kazakhstani securities market. Even
though the National Securities Commission (NSC) is empow-
ered by article 5 to expand the definition of "security" under
the Decree, a direct reference to investment contracts in the
Decree itself would facilitate the enforcement efforts of the
NSC with respect to these types of securities.
156. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
157. Id. at 301.
158. In a classic Ponzi scheme, named after its inventor Charles Ponzi, new
layers of victims enable the swindlers to partially repay previously defrauded cus-
tomers, and thus allow the system to run for a considerable period of time. For a
description of the scheme developed by Ponzi, see Cunningham v. Brown, 265 U.S.
1, 7-9 (1924).
159. The most notorious scandal involved the Russian consortium MMM. In-
vestors had been enticed into investing in MMM by fraudulent promises of exor-
bitant returns; they were ultimately cheated out of their money. See J. Robert
Brown, Jr., Order from Disorder: The Development of the Russian Securities Mar-
kets, 15 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 509, 512 & n.9 (1995). The MMM scandal, howev-
er, is far from the only example. See id. at 512.
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2. Regulation of Companies
a. Registration
The Decree provides for the registration of securities and
disclosure of essential information regarding these securities.
Because of these provisions, the ideology of the Decree is the
same as that in the U.S. securities laws. As President Franklin
D. Roosevelt wrote in his message to Congress, presenting the
draft of the Securities Act of 1933:
There is... an obligation upon us to insist that every
issue of new securities to be sold in interstate commerce shall
be accompanied by full publicity and information, and that no
essentially important element attending the issue shall be
concealed from the buying public.
This proposal adds to the ancient rule of caveat emptor,
the further doctrine "let the seller beware." It puts the bur-
den of telling the whole truth on the seller. It should give
impetus to honest dealing in securities and thereby bring
back public confidence."
The Decree requires every issuer of securities to register
newly issued securities with the NSC and prohibits the sale of
unregistered securities. 6' Interestingly, the Decree does not
exempt any primary distributions from registration. It specifi-
cally states that a security must be registered regardless of the
type and the amount of an offering.'62 Moreover, the Decree
requires any joint-stock company to register its securities with-
in three months from the date of incorporation. 6 ' The Decree
subjects to registration both private placements to no more
than fifty purchasers and public offerings."
The concept of universal registration is quite different
from the concept contained in the U.S. registration require-
ments. The Securities Act of 1933 (the Act) and the SEC regu-
160. H.R. REP. No. 73-85, pt. 1, at 2 (1933) (President's Message to Congress).
161. Securities Decree, supra note 146, art. 17, para. 10. The Decree uses the
term "emitter" instead of "issuer." However, since the word "issuer" has become a
term of art in U.S. securities regulation, and for purposes of convenience, this
article will refer to emitters of securities as issuers of securities, and the emission
of securities will be referred to as the issuance of securities accordingly.
162. Id. para. 1.
163. Id. para. 6.
164. Id. art. 18.
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lations adopted thereunder exempt from registration certain
offerings of securities; the exemptions are based on limitations
on either the number of purchasers or the amount of the offer-
ing. For instance, section 4(2) of the Act states that the regis-
tration provisions should not apply to "transactions by an issu-
er not involving any public offering."16 As the U.S. Supreme
Court explained in SEC v. Ralston Purina Co.,166 this exemp-
tion applies to private placements of securities where the pur-
chasers of the securities do not need the protection of the regis-
tration provisions of the Act." 7 Issuers may use SEC Regula-
tion D, which delineates elements of an offering that will be
exempt from the registration requirements of the Act.'68 Fi-
nally, SEC Regulation A provides a simplified procedure for
the registration of small offerings.'69 Although the Act and
the SEC rules provide for a number of other exemptions, they
are not as widely used as those mentioned above, and they are
most likely inapplicable to the Kazakhstani market. 7 6
Private placement and limited offering exemptions may
come in very handy in Kazakhstan, where many potential
issuers are unable to afford the costs of a fully registered pub-
lic offering. Nevertheless, the drafters of the Decree preferred
to globalize the registration requirements. The rationale be-
hind this decision is not hard to find: the Kazakhstani securi-
ties market has no background in informational efficiency or
full disclosure of essential information. As mentioned above,
the Decree is designed to prohibit abuses and fraudulent prac-
tices that do not yet exist on the market but that are expected
to exist once the market develops. Under the circumstances,
the traditions of economic glasnost (full and accurate disclosure
of information) can be created and developed only through the
rigid government enforcement of disclosure requirements, a
goal that can be achieved only through universal registration
165. Securities Act of 1933 § 4(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1994).
166. 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
167. Id. at 124-25.
168. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-.508 (1996).
169. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251-.263. Regulation A was adopted under § 3(b) of the
Act, which empowers the SEC to exempt from registration requirements certain
public offerings with an aggregate amount of no more than US$5 million. Securi-
ties Act of 1933 § 3(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b).
170. For instance, the intrastate offering exemption of § 3(a)(11), 15 U.S.C.
§ 77c(a)(11), is certainly inapplicable to a unitary country such as Kazakhstan.
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requirements with no loopholes. It is possible that at some
later stage in the development of the Kazakhstani securities
market such comprehensive registration requirements may
adversely affect the expansion of the market, justifying the in-
troduction of exemptions to registration. Presently, however,
the task of preventing fraud and manipulation in the securities
market at the early stages of its development may justify the
rigidity of the Decree.
The Decree delineates the registration procedure for the
issuance of securities. The registration statement must be
examined and declared effective by the NSC. 17 ' The exami-
nation procedure, however, is not designed to determine the
"quality" of the new issue. As article 17 further provides, the
registration may be denied only if the documents submitted to
the NSC do not conform to the requirements of the law.
7 1
These provisions echo the idea that the "[g]overnment cannot
and should not take any action which might be construed as
approving or guaranteeing that newly issued securities are
sound in the sense that their value will be maintained or that
the properties which they represent will earn profit."73
After an issuer submits a registration statement, the NSC
has thirty days to either approve or deny the registration.' 4
The thirty-day limit protects the issuer against bureaucratic
inefficiency of the government. Thus, article 17 of the Decree
contemplates a two-step registration process comprised of a
waiting period and a post-registration period. Article 17 also
provides that the issuance of securities may be commenced
only after their registration.'75 Article 20 of the Decree allows
the issuer to distribute a prospectus only after the registration
of securities,176 and also provides that securities may be sold
no earlier than one month after the publication of a prospec-
171. See Securities Decree, supra note 146, art. 17, para. 1.
172. Id. para. 5. Article 21 further enumerates grounds for denial of registra-
tion: (1) violations of existing Kazakhstan law; (2) inaccurate information in a
prospectus; (3) failure to notify investors if new material information arises during
the issuance, dramatically changing the issuance terms; and (4) the issuing of
securities exceeding the amount disclosed in a registration statement. Id. art. 21,
para. 1.
173. H.R. REP. No. 73-85, pt. 1, at 2 (1933) (President's Message to Congress).
174. See Securities Decree, supra note 146, art. 17, para. 4.
175. Id. para. 1.
176. Id. art. 20, para. 1.
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Thus, the statutory scheme contemplates that securities
may be sold no earlier than one month after the effectiveness
of the registration statement (assuming that the prospectus is
published at the moment of registration). However, it is un-
clear from the Decree whether or not the issuers may make
oral offers to purchasers during the waiting period. In compari-
son, section 5(a)(1) of the Securities Act does not prohibit oral
offers during the waiting period.17 Also, in recognition of the
fact that the prices of securities change rapidly and cannot be
known in advance, sections 5(b)(1) 179 and 10(b) 8 of the Act
allow issuers to deliver a so-called preliminary prospectus,
which must conform to the requirements of SEC Rule 430.18
This complex scheme of the U.S. Securities Act is not contem-
plated by the Decree. Given the "draconian nature" of the De-
cree as a whole, we must presume that any communication
with prospective purchasers of a security during the waiting
period is illegal. This outcome is probably justified at the early
stages of the development of a securities market when fraudu-
lent practices, rather than convenience of the issuers, should
be the main concern of regulators.
What is more troublesome, however, is that the Decree
does not contemplate any exceptions for underwriters. As de-
fined by section 2(11) of the Securities Act, an underwriter is a
person "who has purchased from an issuer with a view to, or
offers or sells for an issuer in connection with, the distribution
of any security... ."8 ' Since the underwriter necessarily
commits itself to purchase securities prior to the filing of a
registration statement, section 2(3) of the Act excludes prelimi-
nary negotiations between an issuer and an underwriter from
the definition of "sale" of securities." The Decree has no
similar exclusion. Moreover, the Decree does not even contain
177. Id. para. 7. The one-month period, adopted from U.S. securities laws, is
apparently designed to prevent "[h]igh-pressure salesmanship . . . before the in-
vesting public [can] digest the information demanded." H.R. REP. No. 73-85, pt. 1,
at 3 (1933).
178. Securities Act of 1933 § 5(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a)(1) (1994).
179. 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b)(1).
180. 15 U.S.C. § 77j(b).
181. 17 C.F.R. § 230.430 (1996).
182. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(11).
183. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(3).
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a definition of "underwriter." Therefore, any underwriting
activity may technically violate the Decree's prohibition to sell
securities prior to the filing of a prospectus and the issuers
may have to conduct offerings of securities by themselves. The
exclusion of underwriting professionals, such as investment
bankers, from the issuance process makes the process very
inefficient and may adversely affect the development of the
securities market in Kazakhstan. Kazakhstani lawmakers
should rethink their position with respect to securities under-
writing and amend the Decree accordingly.
An offering must be concluded within one year after the
registration statement has been approved by the NSC.'" This
provision limits the possibility of shelf registration similar to
that provided by the SEC "shelf-registration" Rule 415."
Given the rigid registration requirements of the Decree, the
one-year time limitation makes sense. A closer look at SEC
Rule 415 shows that shelf registration is available only for
those issuers who have established their reputation on the
market.5 6 In the absence of such "reliable" issuers on the
Kazakhstani market, shelf registration would serve no mean-
ingful purpose.
Another important aspect of registration requirements
under the Decree is the creation of a national register for new
issues. Article 17 of the Decree empowers the NSC to maintain
a national register of securities and requires every issue of
securities to be included in this register.17 This provision is
designed to prevent counterfeiting and over-issue of securities.
Securities-just like any other note, including bank notes-are
just pieces of paper that can be forged easily. Although a com-
plete resolution of the problem of counterfeiting is probably
impossible, as evidenced by diligent but unsuccessful efforts by
184. See Securities Decree, supra note 146, art. 17, para. 6.
185. 17 C.F.R. § 230.415. Rule 415, subject to numerous limitations, allows the
delayed issuance of securities within two years after the effectiveness of a registra-
tion statement. See id. § 230.415(a)(2).
186. Id. § 230.415(a)(1)(x). Rule 415 allows shelf registration for issuers quali-
fied to issue securities on Form S-3, see id. § 239.13, or Form F-3, see id.
§ 239.33, or for issuers who have a long history of public issuance of securities
and if information about the issuer is widely available on the market. Kazakhstan
does not permit shelf registration, nor does it need it, since there are no well-
established issuers in Kazakhstan.
187. Securities Decree, supra note 146, art. 17, paras. 9-10.
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the U.S. Department of Treasury to fight counterfeiting of
dollars, the National Register of securities in Kazakhstan will
provide at least some reference point where the authenticity of
a securities certificate can be ascertained.
Article 19 of the Decree requires issuers to maintain a
registry of its security holders that must reflect changes in
beneficial ownership of the securities at any given moment.'88
Moreover, such a registry must be maintained by an indepen-
dent agency if a joint-stock company has 500 or more share-
holders.'89 The problem with this provision is that it does not
define the term "independent." Such a loophole may allow the
management of the companies to control and manipulate their
registries in order to prevent outside investors from participat-
ing in the management of a company.90 Besides, the absence
of truly independent registries may allow the management of
Kazakhstani companies to over-issue securities, by simply
running printing presses. Licensing of such registries by the
NSC may provide a solution to the problem.
b. Disclosure
As already mentioned, article 20 of the Decree requires the
issuers to provide information about the security in a prospec-
tus.' 9' The contents of the prospectus are determined by the
rules of the NSC.'92 The prospectus must contain an audited
financial statement no older than six months, measured from
the effective date of the registration statement.'93 As of 1995,
the NSC of Kazakhstan adopted the Interim Regulation on
Securities developed by the same group of U.S. securities attor-
neys that drafted the Decree.'
188. Id. art. 19, para. 1.
189. Id., para. 2.
190. The problem of management taking advantage of similar gaps in the regu-
latory framework to maintain control over companies has already arisen in Russia.
See Brown, supra note 159, at 522-23.
191. Securities Decree, supra note 146, art. 20, para. 4.
192. See id. para. 5.
193. See id. para. 3.
194. See Gregory J. Vojack & Farhad Karagusov, Kazakhstan: New Legal
Framework Adopted for Securities Market, EAST/WEST EXECUTIVE GUIDE, May
1995, at 7, 7-8. Mr. Vojack, of Bracewell & Patterson in Almaty, is a Project Di-
rector for the US AID Capital Markets Consortium, Securities Commission Policy
Team, in Kazakhstan.
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Under the Interim Regulation, the prospectus must con-
tain the following information: name and organizational legal
status; name and location of the enterprise's bank; a list of all
shareholders who hold more than five percent equity in the
enterprise; a list of all officers; three years of financial history;
a description of the enterprise's significant assets; authorized
fund capital; information on any administrative sanctions; a
stateinent on the enterprise's use of profit; and a statement of
the material risks of the investment.' Not surprisingly, the
Interim Regulation disclosure requirements reiterate in most
parts the disclosure requirements of SEC Regulation S-K.'96
The major drawback of a disclosure system in Kazakhstan
is the absence of an auditing and accounting system similar to
that in the West. The old Soviet system of accounting was
founded on principles fundamentally different from those ac-
cepted in the West and this difference makes financial disclo-
sures in the Kazakhstani system defective and uninformative.
The accounting principles in former Soviet Republics, having
arisen in a non-market economy, did not develop out of a need
to provide investors with information necessary to make in-
formed investment decisions, but rather to meet the needs of
government authorities, particularly tax authorities.'97 The
problem with accounting principles has not gone unnoticed,
however, and the Ministry of Finance is in the process of
adopting international auditing and accounting standards.'98
Furthermore, the presence of such prominent accounting firms
as Price Waterhouse, Arthur Anderson, and Coopers &
Lybrand in Kazakhstan will probably expedite the process.'99
Therefore, it appears that the problem with the financial dis-
closure in Kazakhstan is a transient one, which will be cured
in the immediate future.
Although the Interim Regulation disclosure requirements
are not the last word (even the term "Interim" suggests that
they are not) on the disclosure of material information about
securities, it is a good start toward creating an efficient securi-
ties market. There is a view to the contrary, however. On the
195. See id. at 8.
196. See generally 17 C.F.R. § 229.10-.915 (1996).
197. See Brown, supra note 159, at 539.
198. See Vojack & Karagusov, supra note 194, at 8.
199. See supra text accompanying note 73.
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basis of his studies of the Russian securities market, Professor
Brown has suggested that no legal reform will bring order to
the markets.0 0 As an example, Brown uses the public offer-
ing by the All-Russian Automobile Alliance (AVVA).20' The
AVVA prospectus "contained no specific discussion of the use of
proceeds, true risks of the investment, the time frame for when
automobile production would begin, and the controlling share-
holders of the shell company," but was, nevertheless, filed with
the Russian Ministry of Finance and was declared effec-
tive.20
2
The disclosure requirements for the issuance of securities
in the Russian Federation are outside the scope of this article;
however, as Professor Brown himself admits, the disclosure
requirements contained in Russian regulations, especially with
respect to financial disclosure, were "inadequate."23 Assum-
ing that this prospectus were offered in Kazakhstan, and as-
suming further that the international auditing and accounting
principles are already in effect there (which should probably
happen in the near future), such a prospectus would have
violated, on its face (at least as described by Professor Brown),
the Interim Regulation disclosure requirements. Consequently,
the NSC could have denied the registration of such securities
pursuant to article 21 of the Decree as containing imprecise
information.0 4 Thus, it appears that detailed and vigorously
enforced disclosure requirements can and will assure that the
investing public receive all necessary information about the
issuer and about the security being issued. Although the
Kazakhstani Interim Regulation may not prevent all disclosure
tricks used by unscrupulous issuers, the persistent improve-
ment and specificity of disclosure requirements in Kazakhstan
may bring order to the market of primary distributions.
3. Regulation of the Industry and Government Oversight
One of the major achievements of the Decree is the estab-
lishment of the National Securities Commission (NSC).20
5
200. Brown, supra note 159, at 556-57.
201. Id. at 540.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 539.
204. Securities Decree, supra note 146, art. 21, para. 1.
205. Id. arts. 9-16.
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"What is unique about Kazakhstan's new NSC is that it is the
first time that one of the former [Soviet] republics has central-
ized the regulation of the securities market into a single agen-
cy with a staff."" 6 The NSC, like the U.S. Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC), consists of a Chairman and four
members who are nominated by the Prime-Minister and ap-
pointed by the President for five-year terms.0 7 To prevent
possible conflicts of interest, NSC Commissioners are prohibit-
ed from participating in any other activities except for academ-
ic or teaching activities."0 The NSC is empowered to create
regional departments to facilitate the enforcement of the secu-
rities laws and oversight of the industry.0 9
The NSC enjoys broad regulatory powers enumerated in
article 12 of the Decree. Under article 12, the NSC develops
and presents to the Parliament any legislation on securities,
conducts registration of newly issued securities, registers for-
eign securities for trading on the territory of Kazakhstan, and
keeps the national register of securities. 21 The Commission
also oversees industry professionals by issuing broker-dealer
and other professional licenses, establishing necessary qualifi-
cations for securities professionals, and controlling the indus-
try through periodic reports by industry members.211 In that
respect, the powers of the NSC are very much like those of the
SEC.212
The powers of the NSC in the enforcement area are, how-
ever, more limited than those of the SEC. The NSC has a right
to conduct investigations after which it may either bring a civil
suit against violators of the securities laws or report the viola-
tion to the prosecutorial organs of Kazakhstan.21 Yet the
NSC has no prosecutorial power under the Decree. Although
the licensing and registration authority of the Commission
206. Vojack & Karagusov, supra note 194, at 7; see Securities Decree, supra
note 146, art. 9.
207. See Securities Decree, supra note 146, art. 14, paras. 1, 3.
208. See id. para. 5. This provision is very important because the first Commis-
sioners were recruited, in part, from the industry. Berger Interview, supra note 36.
209. See Securities Decree, supra note 146, art. 16.
210. Id. art. 12.
211. See id.
212. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77f(a) (1994) (filing of registration statements with
the SEC); 15 U.S.C. § 78o (registration of brokers and dealers with the SEC).
213. See Securities Decree, supra note 146, art. 12.
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implies the power to deny, suspend or revoke the license of any
industry member or deny the registration of securities,214 this
is probably all the Commission can do to fight the violations of
the securities laws. Unlike the SEC's authority to assess mone-
tary penalties,215 the Decree does not provide the NSC with
the power to impose such penalties for violations of the securi-
ties laws. Nor does it give the NSC cease-and-desist author-
ity-a powerful enforcement tool used by the SEC pursuant to
recent amendments to the securities acts.216 Without the
power to punish violators of the Kazakhstani securities regula-
tion, the NSC will have to refer every infraction, however
small, to the prosecutorial organs or to litigate every violation
of the securities laws. For purposes of efficiency and height-
ened respect for the agency, the Decree should be amended to
add these important powers to the NSC enforcement arsenal.
In addition to the creation of the NSC, the Decree provides
for a system of self-regulation of the industry.1 7 The system
of self-regulation certainly adds efficiency to the enforcement of
the securities laws. The self-regulatory organizations (SROs)
are most closely involved in the day-to-day running of the
market and therefore are best situated to perform the bulk of
securities regulation. Even though the SROs can potentially be
biased in favor of industry members, proper supervision by the
government agency may assure a disinterested position. Ex-
pansive self-regulation under governmental supervision is
inherent not only in the U.S. securities markets, but also has
been adopted in England.2 ' Accordingly, the drafters of the
Decree provided some framework for a system of self-regula-
tion in the Kazakhstan securities industry. The system envi-
sioned by the Decree, however, is somewhat different from that
of the United States.
214. See id. art. 21, para. 1.
215. See Securities Law Enforcement Remedies Act of 1990 § 21B, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78u-2(a) (1994).
216. See id. § 8A, 15 U.S.C. § 77h-1; id. § 21C, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-3. Cease and
desist authority, though a relatively recent empowerment, is believed to enhance
the SEC's ability to flexibly tailor remedies to the facts and circumstances of a
particular case. See S. REP. NO. 101-337, at 3, 20 (1990).
217. Securities Decree, supra note 146, art. 27.
218. See POSER, supra note 122, § 3.1.1, at 83-90 (discussing the Gower Report,
see L.C.B. GOWER, REVIEW OF INVESTOR PROTECTION (1984), and the British
government's "White Paper," see DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY, FINANCIAL
SERVICES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM (1985)).
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For purposes of economy of scale and most efficient pricing
and liquidity, the drafters of the Decree suggested that
Kazakhstan have only one stock exchange. 1 9 An over-the-
counter market (OTC) apparently was considered unacceptable
at this stage. This view was reflected in Chapter 5 of the De-
cree entitled "Stock Exchange."
220
According to the Decree, a stock exchange formed pursu-
ant to the Decree must be licensed by the NSC22' and formed
as a joint-stock company.2  Further, a stock exchange must
have minimum capitalization equal to 10,000 times the mini-
mum wage established in the country at the time of licens-
ing. The Stock Exchange is governed by a board whose
members may not be government officials or the directors of
the issuers listed on the stock exchange.2  Membership in
the Stock Exchange is limited to licensed securities profession-
als and may include foreign persons duly licensed by the
NSC.22
The Decree requires the stock exchange to adopt trading
rules and listing requirements, and to maintain and publish a
pricing system.226 Also, pursuant to this chapter of the De-
cree, the Stock Exchange is required to adopt and enforce regu-
lation of its members, 227 and may impose monetary penalties
for the violation of these regulations.2 8 It also may suspend
or revoke membership of a violator. 9 In addition to the reg-
ulation of the Stock Exchange, the Decree envisions the possi-
bility of other self-regulatory organizations. The definitional
section of the Decree specifically provides the definition of the
"Associations of Professional Participants" (SROs).30
Although the Decree provides for a framework of self-regu-
lation very similar to that in the United States, one major
219. See Structure of a Secondary Market, supra note 37.
220. Securities Decree, supra note 146, arts. 31-44.
221. Id. art. 32, para. 4.
222. Id. art. 31, para. 1.
223. See id. art. 32, para. 2. As of May 1995, this amount equals US$2 million.
See Vojack & Karagusov, supra note 194, at 8.
224. See Securities Decree, supra note 146, art. 34, para. 2.
225. See id. art. 33, para. 2.
226. Id. art. 38, para. 2.
227. See id.
228. See id.
229. See id. art. 32, para. 4; id. art. 38, para. 2.
230. Id. art. 3.
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distinction should be noted. Under section 15(b)(8) of the Secu-
rities Exchange Act, every broker-dealer must be registered
with a registered securities association."1 The Decree has no
requirement that a market professional be a member of one of
the SROs in addition to being duly licensed by the NSC. 2
However, the absence of mandatory membership in one of the
SROs is not illogical. First, such absence has its precedents in
world securities practice. For instance, according to a regu-
latory scheme envisioned by Professor Gower for the securities
industry in England, a broker-dealer would have had a choice
of seeking authorization directly from a British government
agency or with an SRO recognized by such agency.s Second,
the structure of the Kazakhstani market, with only one stock
exchange, makes it impossible for a broker-dealer to conduct
business without being a member of the Stock Exchange. The
problem may arise with the development of an OTC market
where broker-dealers are able to transact business outside the
Stock Exchange and therefore do not need its membership.
However, the development of the OTC market in the
Kazakhstani economy at this stage is so unlikely and will
cause so many regulatory problems that no SRO will be able to
resolve them.' Under the circumstances, the drafters of the
Decree correctly chose not to overburden an immature
Kazakhstani securities industry with economically and legally
unnecessary requirements.
4. Private Enforcement of the Securities Laws in Kazakhstan
Proper enforcement of the Kazakhstani securities regula-
tion is crucial for the development of a securities market. As
noted before, the Kazakhstani market has to rely, for the most
231. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(8) (1994). Currently the National Association of the
Securities Dealers (NASD) is the only registered securities association in the Unit-
ed States.
232. See Securities Decree, supra note 146, art. 27.
233. See POSER, supra note 122, at 86 (citing GOWER, supra note 218, 2.11).
234. It is much easier to control an auction market (such as a Stock Ex-
change), which is physically concentrated in one place, than to regulate an OTC
market, with its amorphous structure and lack of centralized trading. Even though
the OTC market can be made more organized through the introduction of the
automated trading system (like NASDAQ), only two countries-the United States
and Britain-have such a system, and it would be too ambitious to project the
same for Kazakhstan.
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part, on foreign institutional investors, because the
Kazakhstani economy is not strong enough to raise capital
exclusively from domestic sources. In order to attract foreign
investors, Kazakhstan has to compete with a few dozen other
emerging markets. All economic factors being equal,
Kazakhstan may win this competition only if it is able to offer
foreign investors a market environment to which they are
accustomed. Clearly, a system of enforcement that closely re-
sembles that of the world's leading securities markets will
make these institutional investors most comfortable about
investing in the Kazakhstani market.
It appears that Kazakhstani laws related to the securities
regulation can provide for such a "westernized" enforcement
scheme. Certain liabilities and remedies are contained in the
Decree itself, while the others can be found in the new
Kazakhstan Civil Code (the Code or the Civil Code). 5 The
Decree and the Code together provide powerful tools for both
administrative and private enforcement of the securities laws.
It should be noted, however, that the presence of suitable legis-
lation does not guarantee securities enforcement & lAmericain.
Unfortunately, there is not sufficient information about the
Kazakhstani court system to predict the attitude of the
Kazakhstani judiciary toward the enforcement of Kazakhstani
securities regulation. This article merely tries to suggest ways
in which the Kazakhstani securities enforcement scheme can
be adapted to fit the standards of a Western investor.
In a discussion of remedies and liabilities, it is very impor-
tant to keep in mind that Kazakhstan is a civil law country
and all remedies and liabilities are created by statutes. Article
7 of the Civil Code provides grounds for civil rights and duties
to arise." Under article 7, civil rights arise partially out of
contracts, transactions provided by legislation, and transac-
tions not provided by legislation but not contrary to legislative
acts.237 Civil rights can also arise out of administrative
235. The Civil Code of Kazakhstan was adopted by the Supreme Soviet of
Kazakhstan on December 27, 1994. See THE CIVIL CODE OF KAZAKHSTAN, supra
note 85, at 1. Because of the dissolution of Parliament in 1995, it is unclear
whether the old or new Civil Code is now in effect in Kazakhstan. However, the
old Code does not mention securities at all. Therefore, I will rely on the new Code
in discussing liabilities and remedies.
236. CIVIL CODE, supra note 104, art. 7.
237. Id. art. 7, para. 2(1).
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acts,"5 such as the Securities Decree. 9 Additionally, citi-
zens may effectuate their civil rights through the right to the
defense thereof.'0 The right of defense may be exercised ei-
ther through recourse to a government agency in charge or
through the assertion of rights in a lawsuit. 1 In furtherance
of his or her right of defense, the damaged party may recover
compensatory damages, including consequential damages-in
the wording of the Code, "revenues not received which this
person would have received under ordinary conditions of turn-
over if his right had not been violated (lost advantage)." 2
Finally, an individual who has sustained losses because of the
government agency's failure to act can recover those losses
from the state. 3
Thus, the principle of the right of defense gives a person
who has sustained losses as the result of a violation of securi-
ties regulations the right to recover compensatory damages
and lost opportunity damages through a lawsuit in the courts.
In the alternative, a person can recover from the NSC, provid-
ed that the NSC failed to enforce properly the securities laws
and provided that this failure caused losses to the person. It is
clear that the right of defense for violation of securities laws
arises out of specific legislative provisions that expressly give
an individual such a right. The question remains, however,
whether, under the Kazakhstani civil law system, the right of
defense may arise out of those provisions of the Decree that do
not expressly give a private plaintiff a right to sue but simply
make unlawful certain activities that have injured the plain-
tiff.
In common law systems, the courts have historically en-
joyed law-creating powers such as finding an implied right of
action where the statute is otherwise silent on the subject."
In the context of securities laws, the U.S. courts have found an
238. See id. art. 7, para. 2(2).
239. Securities Decree, supra note 146.
240. See CIVIL CODE, supra note 104, art. 8(1).
241. See id. art. 9(2). Recourse to an agency does not preclude the party from
bringing a lawsuit in court. See id.
242. Id. art. 9(4), para. 2.
243. See id. art. 9(5).
244. See Christopher A. Ford, Judicial Discretion in International Jurispru.
dence: Article 38(1)(c) and 'General Principles of Law," 5 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L
L. 35, 54-55 (1994).
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implied private right of action under section 10(b) of the Secu-
rities Exchange Act."5 However, such an implied right of ac-
tion does not necessarily exist in civil law systems.246 It is
difficult to predict whether Kazakhstani courts will adopt im-
plied private rights of action for violations of the securities
laws, but, as stated above, the more Americanized system of
securities enforcement may give the Kazakhstani market a
competitive edge among other emerging markets. 7 There-
fore, for purposes of this article, all of the provisions that may
give rise to liability are discussed.
Article 17 of the Decree provides that the issuance of un-
registered securities is per se illegal and that the money
earned as a result of an unregistered issue shall be confiscated
and returned to the purchasers of unregistered securities." 8
In other words, the Decree gives the purchasers of unregis-
tered securities standing to sue the issuer for rescission, a
remedy similar to that contained in section 12(1) of the Secu-
rities Act of 1933.' 9 This provision of the Decree, on its face,
imposes strict liability on an issuer who has sold its securities
in violation of the registration requirements of the Decree.
Article 24 of the Decree expressly imposes liability on an
issuer for false and misleading, untrue or incomplete state-
ments in a prospectus and for any other false and misleading
information with respect to the financial and economic activi-
ties of the issuer' ° This article closely resembles section
245. Superintendent of Ins. of N.Y. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13
n.9 (1971).
246. For instance, the European Court of Justice implied a private right of
action under the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (EEC
Treaty), giving a direct effect to the Treaty where the Treaty itself did not provide
for such a private right of action. See Case 26/62, Van Gend & Loos v.
Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen [Netherlands Inland Revenue Adminis-
tration], 1963 E.C.R. 1, [19631 2 C.M.L.R. 105. However, this decision was a nov-
elty that enraged some Member States of the European Community.
The opinion of Advocate General Karl Roemer, while not adopted by the
court, represents the prevailing attitude in civil law countries toward implied pri-
vate rights of action. Mr. Roemer pointed out that the EEC Treaty imposes obliga-
tions only on Member States, and should not give rise to a private right of action,
since such an action is not provided for under the national laws of some Member
States. See id. at 21, [1963] 2 C.M.L.R. at 115.
247. See supra introductory paragraph to Part III.B.4.
248. Securities Decree, supra note 146, art. 17, para. 10.
249. Securities Act of 1933 § 12(1), 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1994).
250. Securities Decree, supra note 146, art. 24, para. 1.
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12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, which gives an express
right of action for false and misleading statements in connec-
tion with the offer and sale of securities."' Under article 24,
the issuer is liable for damages to an investor who sustained a
loss as a result of misleading statements made by the issu-
erY
2
It appears that article 24, on its face, is a negligence stat-
ute and does not require a proof of scienter. 3 Indeed, in U.S.
securities jurisprudence, the scienter requirement has been
found only under those provisions that speak "so specifically in
terms of manipulation and deception, and of implementing
devices and contrivances-the commonly understood terminolo-
gy of intentional wrongdoing... ."' By contrast, article 24
gives a right of action not only for untrue statements, but also
for imprecise and incomplete statements. 5 In other words,
article 24 contemplates liability for innocent omissions as well
as for intentional misstatements.Y Finally, the purchaser of
a security sold by means of misrepresentation can recover
damages to the fullest extent provided by the law." 7 Going
back to article 9(4) of the Civil Code, this probably means that
there is a possibility of recovering compensatory damages and
benefit-of-the-bargain damages."
Article 24 also contains an anti-waiver provision.259 Like
section 14 of the Securities Act,2 0 article 24 makes void any
agreement that tends to limit investors' rights under the arti-
251. 15 U.S.C. § 771(2).
252. Securities Decree, supra note 146, art. 24, para. 1.
253. Id.
254. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 214 (1976).
255. Securities Decree, supra note 146, art. 24, para. 1.
256. Article 24 states in pertinent part: "If ... information about an [issuer's]
financial-economic activity contains intentionally false, inaccurate or incomplete
data that have detrimentally affected investors, the [issuer] shall bear full finan-
cial responsibility for damages incurred upon securities-holders." Id. art. 24, para.
1. Under the rules of statutory interpretation, the word "intentionally" modifies
only the word "false," and does not modify "inaccurate" or "incomplete." Thus, a
company that negligently issues inaccurate or incomplete information to security
holders could potentially be liable under the Securities Decree. This interpretation
of the English text is supported by the wording of the official Russian text of the
Securities Decree.
257. See id.
258. CIVIL CODE, supra note 104, art. 9(4); see supra note 242 and accompany-
ing text.
259. Securities Decree, supra note 146, art. 24, para. 2.
260. Securities Act of 1933 § 14, 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1994).
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cle.2"' The anti-waiver provision is especially important be-
cause of the lack of experience of Kazakhstani investors. This
provision guarantees that an inexperienced investor will not be
coerced into inadvertently giving away his or her rights under
the Decree. However, unlike section 14, which applies to the
entire statute, the anti-waiver provision in article 24 applies
only to liability under that article. All other provisions of the
Decree thus appear to be waivable, by negative implication. To
avoid this result, the anti-waiver provision should be moved to
a separate section applicable to the whole Decree.
Unfortunately, article 24 has very limited force since it
imposes liability only on the issuer.262 This liability may,
however, be extended through article 20 of the Decree, which
imposes upon the signatories of the prospectus responsibility
for false and misleading statements in a prospectus.2 11 This
provision has its analog in the U.S. securities laws and is in a
way a hybrid of sections 12 and 11 of the Securities Act. Like
section 12(2) of the Securities Act, 2  article 20 deals with
misleading statements in a prospectus. In other aspects, article
20 is similar to section 11(a)(1) of the U.S. Securities Act which
imposes liability for misleading and untrue statements in a
registration statement on every person who signed the regis-
tration statement and on some other categories of offering
participants. 5 Since the Decree does not contemplate any
exemptions from registration, this approach is reasonable be-
cause a prospectus and registration statement are likely signed
by the same persons. The major difference, however, is in the
wording of section 11 and article 20. Section 11 expressly gives
an injured private party a cause of action for misleading state-
ments. 66 In contrast, article 20 merely states that signatories
to a prospectus are responsible for false and misleading state-
ments in it. 2 7 Although article 20 does not expressly provide
for a private cause of action, such an action can be found if
article 20 is read in conjunction with articles 7, 8 and 9 of the
261. Securities Decree, supra note 146, art. 24, para. 2.
262. Id.
263. Id. art. 20, para. 6.
264. 15 U.S.C. § 771(2).
265. Id. § 77k(a)(1).
266. Id. § 77k(a).
267. Securities Decree, supra note 146, art. 20, para. 6.
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Civil Code. 8 A combined reading demonstrates that article
20 gives rise to civil rights and duties that can be effectuated
through the right of defense-the right exercisable in part by
bringing a lawsuit for damages. The question arises, then, of
the elements of such possible cause of action. Since the Decree
is patterned after the U.S. securities laws, it is not surprising
that the cause of action under article 20 will closely resemble
the cause of action under section 11 of the Securities Act.
It appears that the knowledge of truth by a purchaser at
the time of purchase is a defense to article 20 liability, as it is
under section 11 of the Securities Act.269 Although the De-
cree, on its face, is silent as to the knowledge of truth, article
8(4) of the Civil Code imposes a duty of good faith and reason-
ableness of actions on the participants in civil legal rela-
tions.270 Thus, at least arguably, an action by a purchaser of
securities for false and misleading statements in a prospectus
would be barred if the purchaser knew the truth about the
securities, despite the misleading statements in the prospectus.
Another substantial aspect in which article 20 differs from
section 11 is that unlike section 11, article 20 does not impose
responsibility on anyone other than the signatories to a pro-
spectus. The argument can be made that article 20 liability
will cover a joint-stock company that has issued securities
because, in a way, the company is a signatory to a prospectus
through its officers and directors who physically signed the
document. However, this is not the only argument that can be
made under article 20 and, in any case, the issuer's liability is
contemplated under article 24. Since the Decree does not indi-
cate who exactly must sign the prospectus, it is possible that
certain categories of persons who participate in a public offer-
ing but have not signed the prospectus will escape liability.
This is a serious loophole in the Decree. Even though article 20
268. See supra text accompanying notes 236-43.
269. Section 11 of the Securities Act specifically bars suit by a person who "at
the time of such acquisition... knew of such untruth or omission." 15 U.S.C.
§ 77k(a).
270. Article 8(4) provides:
Citizens and juridical persons must act in good faith, reasonably, and
justly when effectuating the rights which belong to them, complying with
the requirements contained in legislation .... The good faith, reason-
ableness, and justness of actions of the participants of civil legal relations
shall be presupposed.
CIVIL CODE, supra note 104, art. 8(4).
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delegates to the NSC the authority to clarify the provisions of
this article, the better solution would be to enumerate signa-
tories to a prospectus in the Decree, as is done in section 6(a)
of the Securities Act of 1933.271
If the liability of issuers in primary distributions is more
or less clear under the Decree, the civil liability of securities
professionals for misconduct in secondary trading is very limit-
ed. An industry professional may lose his or her license for
violation of the trading rules,2 72 but revocation of a license is
of little value to the defrauded investor who has lost all of his
or her money. Besides, the enforcement abilities of the NSC
are certainly not enough to uncover and prosecute each and
every case of the securities fraud. Consider the following state-
ment that advocates the need for private enforcement in the
context of the U.S. securities laws:
Not only do the various private remedies provide relief to
those harmed by a securities law violation, but more impor-
tantly the existence of a private remedy is a powerful incen-
tive for individuals and companies to comply with the securi-
ties laws. The latter is especially significant in light of the
Commission's resources for oversight and enforcement; ... its
staff is more highly concentrated on the regulatory aspects of
its mission than on enforcement.273
This proposition is even more true for the Kazakhstani
situation. The NSC is much less experienced in the enforce-
ment of securities laws than is the SEC. Also, the NSC is faced
with a tremendous regulatory task; the whole regulatory
scheme is yet to be created. Under these circumstances, the
NSC's enforcement activities will either be very limited or will
be done at the expense of regulatory work. Certainly, clear
delineation of the express civil liabilities of market participants
in the would Decree be very helpful and the Decree should be
amended to that effect. In the meantime, the articles of the
Decree that outlaw certain activities should be interpreted as
authorizing private rights of action.
271. 15 U.S.C. § 77f(a) (stipulating required signatories to a securities registra-
tion).
272. See Securities Decree, supra note 146, art. 25, para. 6.
273. JAMEs D. COX ET AL., SEcURmEs REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS
1076 (1991).
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The only express civil liability in the Decree in relation to
secondary trading would strike the U.S. securities lawyer as
quite unusual. Article 42 of the Decree provides an express
private right of action for damages against a stock exchange
for failure to enforce its rules and regulations. 4 The pre-
vailing view in U.S. securities laws is that stock exchanges and
other self-regulatory organizations are not liable to private
plaintiffs for failure to enforce their rules." We can only
speculate as to why the team of the U.S. securities lawyers
who drafted the Decree decided to contravene precedent in the
U.S. securities law. The "deep pocket theory" appears to be the
most plausible explanation: in the capital-hungry Kazakhstani
market, the stock exchange is probably one of a very few defen-
dants that can satisfy a judgment against it and successfully
pass the costs of liability on to the industry.
Another possible reason for such liability is based on the
perception that a stock exchange is more of a profit-making
establishment, unlike the New York Stock Exchange and other
U.S. self-regulatory organizations, which are organized as not-
for-profit corporations with extensive regulatory functions. The
likelihood that this view has actually influenced the drafters of
the Decree is supported by the fact that the liability of the
stock exchange is the only express civil liability of market
participants. Although the for-profit nature of the now-existing
Kazakh Stock Exchange may well dominate its regulatory
function in today's reality, such a view discounts the self-regu-
latory role of the stock exchange "designed to prevent
fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices, [and] to pro-
mote just and equitable principles of trade ... ,27 If
Kazakhstan wants to create a viable securities market, it
should rethink its position with respect to the organization of
the stock exchange.
In order to successfully assert an article 42 action, a plain-
tiff must establish that the stock exchange failed to enforce its
rules in good faith and, as a result of such failure, the plaintiff
sustained damages. 77 How strict or lenient the Kazakhstani
274. Securities Decree, supra note 146, art. 42.
275. See, e.g., Walck v. American Stock Exch., Inc., 687 F.2d 778, 786 (3d Cir.
1982) (Congress did not intend to give a private right of action under section 6 of
the Securities Exchange Act).
276. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 6(b)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)(5) (1994).
277. Securities Decree, supra note 146, art. 42. Although article 42 does not
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courts may be in interpreting this provision remains to be seen
but, even on its face, article 42 gives the stock exchange a good
faith defense to any action against it. Therefore, one can envi-
sion many situations in which a direct action against an un-
scrupulous market participant, rather than against the stock
exchange, will be more fruitful.
The Decree does not specifically grant a private right of
action against market participants, but it contains limitations
on market participants' activities. 7 ' These limitations relate
mostly to insider trading.279 Although insider trading regula-
tion has been subject to debate, it received universal recogni-
tion by securities regulators in the world's leading securities
centers, such as the United States, the European Union, and
Japan."' As some commentators noted:
Reasonable or not, a fear that the average investor would
respond to the belief that systematic trading advantages ac-
crue to those "in the know" (corporate executives, their fami-
lies, and friends) by withdrawing from the securities mar-
ketplace has echoed repeatedly. Also, the attack against in-
sider trading, a campaign for fair play in the stock markets,
has had enduring political appeal.28'
Kazakhstan also joined the quest for fairness in the stock
market by outlawing certain activities associated with insider
trading, in a manner sometimes even more rigorous than the
U.S. securities regulation. Market participants who own five
percent or more of the stock of an issuer are flatly prohibited
from trading in the issuer's securities.282 Such a flat prohibi-
tion does not exist in the U.S. securities laws.283 Also, per-
sons who possess material non-public information may not use
specifically refer to a duty of good faith, this duty is imposed by article 8(4) of the
Civil Code, which must be read in conjunction with the Securities Decree. See
supra note 270 and accompanying text.
278. Id. art. 30, paras. 1-3.
279. See id. paras. 4-6.
280. See, e.g., Council Directive 89/592, 1989 O.J. (L 334) 30 (insider trading
directive of the European Union).
281. Cox ET AL., supra note 273, at 823.
282. See Securities Decree, supra note 146, art. 30, para. 1. There is an excep-
tion, however, for investment funds. See id.
283. Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78p, which
imposes liability for short-swing profit-making, impairs an insider's ability to trade
only over a six-month time period.
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it to their own personal advantage or to "tip" others." Once
again, the U.S. securities statutes do not contain an "abstain
or disclose" requirement. However, this theory rests on a sub-
sequent U.S. Supreme Court opinion" and, therefore, has
been utilized by the U.S. drafters of the Decree. Finally, article
30 broadly defines the categories of statutory insiders: direc-
tors and officers of the issuer; market participants having a
contractual relationship with the issuer; auditors of the issuer;
and government employees who have access to the information
about the issuer.286
As noted before, the Decree does not expressly grant a
private cause of action against insider traders.287 It merely
states that violators of an insider trading regulation are sub-
ject to liability "under the existing legislation."' A private
cause of action can be found, however, if we apply to the insid-
er trading regulation the same analysis based on articles 7, 8,
and 9 of the Civil Code, as we did with respect to article
20. 9 Just as in article 20, the article 30 insider trading reg-
ulation gives rise to civil rights and duties that can be effectu-
ated through the right of defense. Even though the argument
for a private right of action under article 30 is not without
merit, an express cause of action for insider trading certainly
would have facilitated the enforcement of this prohibition.
Besides article 42 liability of the stock exchange for failure
to enforce its rules and possibly article 30 liability for insider
trading, the Decree contains no other anti-fraud provisions
with respect to the secondary market in securities. Grounds for
liability can be found, however, in the Civil Code. Article
159(9) of the Code provides that "[a] transaction concluded
under the influence of fraud... may be deemed by a court to
be invalid upon the suit of the victim."29 ° As a consequence of
the fraudulent transaction, the victim has a right to a remedy
of rescission.29'
The concept of fraud is not defined in the Code, probably
284. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230 & n.12 (1980).
285. See id.
286. Securities Decree, supra note 146, art. 30, para. 6.
287. See supra text accompanying note 278.
288. See Securities Decree, supra note 146, art. 30, para. 5.
289. See supra text accompanying notes 236-43, 268.
290. CIVIL CODE, supra note 104, art. 159(9).
291. See id. art. 157(3).
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because the Code uses this word in its conventional sense. In
the securities context, however, the ordinary meaning of fraud
is not always workable, especially as applied to market manip-
ulation.292 The reasons for the expansion of the concept of
fraud in application to the securities industry were succinctly
stated in Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC:
[The securities firm is] under a special duty, in view of its
expert knowledge and proffered advice, not to take advantage
of its customers' ignorance of market conditions....
We need not stop to decide... how far common-law
fraud was shown. For the business of selling investment
securities has been considered one peculiarly in need of regu-
lation for the protection of the investor. 3
Therefore, Kazakhstani securities regulators should not rely on
generic civil liabilities, but rather should add anti-manipula-
tive and anti-fraud provisions to the Decree, specifically tai-
lored to fight securities fraud and market manipulation in the
secondary market.
The discussion of remedies and liabilities under
Kazakhstani securities law would be incomplete without a
discussion of limitation periods. The Decree itself does not
contain any statute of limitations, but the general limitations
period under the Civil Code is three years.294 The parties
may not, by an agreement or otherwise, change the duration of
the limitations period. 5 The commencement of the limita-
tions period is subject to a discovery rule: the limitations peri-
od begins to run when a person knew or should have known
that his or her rights were violated.9 Thus, a limitations pe-
riod under the Kazakhstan Civil Code may be longer than
most statutes of limitations under the U.S. securities laws,
which allow an action to be brought within one year from dis-
covery of untrue facts but no more than three years from the
date of occurrence or event giving rise to the cause of ac-
tion.2 97
292. See discussion supra notes 136-40 and accompanying text.
293. 139 F.2d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1943).
294. CIVIL CODE, supra note 104, art. 178(1).
295. See id. art. 177(2).
296. See id. art. 180(l).
297. See Securities Act of 1933 § 13, 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1994) (false registration
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The overview of the Decree on Securities of the Republic of
Kazakhstan and its comparison to the U.S. securities laws is
far from complete. But even a cursory look at the Decree shows
that it lays down some basic rules for a securities market. At
the very least, the Decree gives an investor in the Kazakhstani
market the ability to purchase a registered security accompa-
nied by a disclosure statement through a licensed securities
professional where both the issuer of a security and the securi-
ties professional are subject to liability for any fraudulent acts.
Even though these rules may be imperfect, they bring some
investor protection to the securities trading in Kazakhstan.
Without that protection, a securities market in Kazakhstan is
impossible, regardless of its economic conditions.
C. The Next Step in Securities Regulation-Investment
Company Law
While there is hardly any doubt about the need for securi-
ties regulation in Kazakhstan, the extent to which the industry
must be regulated presents a more difficult question. At this
stage, the Kazakhstani government has made only the first
steps toward regulating the securities market. Much more has
to be done to assure the proper functioning of this market. In
particular, the specifics of the privatization program in
Kazakhstan, which is conducted primarily through investment
funds, 298 calls for special legislation governing investment
companies.
The need for the regulation of investment companies stems
from the nature of their assets. The Report by the U.S. Senate
Committee on Banking and Currency made before the enact-
ment of the Investment Company Act vividly shows the neces-
sity of such legislation:
The assets of [investment] companies invariably consist of
cash and securities, assets which are completely liquid, mo-
bile and readily negotiable. Because of these characteristics,
control of such funds offers manifold opportunities for exploi-
statements and misleading prospectuses); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 9(e),
15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (manipulation of securities prices); id. § 18(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78r(c)
(misleading statements); see also Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v.
Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 361 (1991) (applying one-year/three-year scheme to im-
plied rights of action).
298. See supra text accompanying notes 95-98.
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tation by the unscrupulous managements of some companies.
These assets can and have been easily misappropriated and
diverted by such types of managements, and have been em-
ployed to foster their personal interests rather than the inter-
ests of public security holders. It is obvious that in the ab-
sence of regulatory legislation, individuals who lack integrity
will continue to be attracted by the opportunities for personal
profit available in the control of the liquid assets of invest-
ment companies and that deficiencies which have occurred in
the past will continue to occur in the future."
The same considerations as those advanced in the Senate
Report apply equally-and maybe even more so-to the
Kazakhstani securities market. Kazakhstani investors are even
less experienced than their American counterparts were in
1940. Kazakhstani investment funds, °0 which produce exor-
bitant and easily obtainable profits in an economy plagued by
capital deficiency, present an attractive target for organized
crime. Under such circumstances, there is hardly any question
about the need for an investment company law. Therefore, in
the fall of 1994, the US AID team submitted to the
Kazakhstani legislature, in addition to the Decree on Securi-
ties, a draft of the Law on Investment Funds and Companies
(ICL Draft).30'
Although the ICL Draft uses many provisions of the U.S.
Investment Companies Act of 1940 (1940 Act),30 2 it is much
simpler and shorter than the 1940 Act. The simplicity of the
ICL Draft is more suitable to the local conditions in
Kazakhstan. Clearly, the Kazakhstani market does not need
such a complex regulation of investment companies, as provid-
ed by the 1940 Act. However, the market does need some legis-
lation that will demonstrate the government's willingness to
299. SENATE COMM. ON BANKNG AND CURRENCY, INVESTMENT COMPANY ACT
OF 1940 AND INVESTMENT ADVISERS ACT OF 1940, S. REP. No. 76-1775, at 6 (3d
Sess. 1940).
300. For a discussion of Kazakhstani investment funds and their role in the
Kazakhstani privatization program, see supra text accompanying notes 27-28.
301. See Memorandum from Gregory Vojack to Alti A. Tleuberdin, Presidential
Aide (Oct. 5, 1994) (on file with the Brooklyn Journal of International Law); Law
on Investment Companies in the Republic of Kazakhstan (Proposed Official Draft
1994) [hereinafter ICL Draft] (translated version on file with the Brooklyn Journal
of International Law).
302. Investment Companies Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 80a-64 (1994).
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regulate investment companies. In that respect, the purpose of
the ICL Draft is similar to that of securities regulation in other
developing countries; it is designed to create "an improved
sense of fiduciary obligation and commercial morality, without
which it is difficult to imagine broad public participation in the
capital markets.""'3
Article 1 of the ICL Draft defines an Investment Company
as:
[A] specialized organization professionally engaged in attrac-
tion of monetary resources by means of issuing securities for
the purpose of further investing them into other [issuers']
securities, and also management of portfolios of investment
securities owned by the Company. Any economic entity re-
gardless of its property forming the authorized fund through
an open distribution of securities using 40% or more of its net
assets for investment into Investment Securities shall be
regulated by the norms of this law."°
This definition presents a simplified version of section 3(a)
of the 1940 Act."5 Unlike the 1940 Act, the ICL Draft does
not cover issuers that issue "face-amount certificates of the
installment type."30 6 Most likely, this omission occurred not
because the drafters of the ICL Draft did not perceive such
issuers as investment companies, but merely because these
instruments are non-existent on the Kazakhstani market. In
all other respects, the definition serves the same role as the
definition in section 3(a) of the 1940 Act: a company may be-
come an investment company either against its wishes or
merely inadvertently.0 7
Just as in the 1940 Act, the ICL Draft definition concen-
trates on two aspects of a company that make it an investment
company: the type of business carried out by the company
(investment of monetary resources in securities) and the type
of holdings of the company (forty percent or more of securities
303. Poser, supra note 41, at 1293 (describing the goals of the Brazilian Capi-
tal Markets Law, but equally applicable here).
304. ICL Draft, supra note 301, art. 1.
305. Investment Companies Act of 1940 § 3(a), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a) (1994).
306. Id. § 80a-3(a)(2).
307. See 1 TAMAR FRANKEL, THE REGULATION OF MONEY MANAGERS A§1, at
198 (1978).
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of other issuers).08° To avoid an inadvertent inclusion of hold-
ing companies within the definition of investment companies,
the stock of the company and its subsidiaries are excluded
from the definition of Investment Securities.0 9
An investment company must be set up in the form of an
open joint-stock company.3 ' This approach is very different
from that of the 1940 Act, which left the investment companies
relatively free to organize in any form they wish.31' It is pos-
sible that the authors of the ICL Draft were concerned with
the fact that interests in limited partnerships (another possible
form of an investment company) and other investment ar-
rangements are not securities within the definition of the Secu-
rities Decree' and, therefore, are not subject to its registra-
tion requirements.
Under the ICL Draft, an investment company must in-
clude the words "investment company" in its name; 13 no oth-
er company may use such designation. " This requirement
echoes section 35(d) of the 1940 Act3 5 and the provisions of
general corporation laws that attempt to prevent companies
from deceiving the general population by using misleading
names.
31 6
The ICL Draft envisions two types of investment compa-
nies: open and closed.3 7 An open type of authorized fund of
an investment company is a fund that issues securities with an
obligation to redeem them, and a closed type of authorized
fund of an investment company is a fund that does not have
such obligation.318 The classification of investment companies
under the ICL Draft is the same as the one used for invest-
ment companies in section 5 of the 1940 Act.1 9 Just as with
308. ICL Draft, supra note 301, art. 1.
309. See id. art. 2, para. 7.
310. See id. art. 4, para. 1.
311. See 1 FRANKEL, supra note 307, A§2, at 199.
312. See supra notes 150-54 and accompanying text.
313. ICL Draft, supra note 301, art. 4, para. 2.
314. Id.
315. Investment Companies Act of 1940 § 35(d), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-34(d) (1994).
316. See generally Lucian Wayne Beavers & William R. Laney, Choosing and
Protecting the Corporate Name, 30 OKLA. L. REV. 507, 518-22 (1977).
317. ICL Draft, supra note 301, art. 2, paras. 5-6.
318. See id.
319. Investment Companies Act of 1940 § 5(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-5(a)(1) (open-
end companies-those that issue redeemable securities); id. § 5(a)(2), 15 U.S.C.
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the definition of an investment company, the ICL Draft does
not include certain types of investment companies, such as
unit investment trusts2 and face-amount certificate compa-
nies.32' Once again, the drafters chose not to include the
structures that do not exist on the market and are unlikely to
appear in the foreseeable future.
The provisions of articles 9, 10, and 11 are the core of the
ICL Draft.3" These provisions deal with the registration of
investment companies." The second clause of article 9 of the
ICL Draft provides that the securities of an investment compa-
ny are subject to the registration requirements of the Securi-
ties Decree." This provision makes it clear that other regis-
tration requirements, as they pertain to the investment compa-
nies and its management, do not relieve the company from an
obligation to register its securities under the Securities Decree.
Article 10 requires an investment company to obtain a
license as a market participant from the NSC" 5 In that re-
spect, the regulatory scheme of the ICL Draft follows the ideol-
ogy of the 1940 Act, which requires all investment companies
to register under this Act. 6 A few major differences between
the ICL Draft's and the 1940 Act's registration requirements
demand special attention. First, unlike the 1940 Act, which
has its own registration requirements, the ICL Draft subjects
investment companies to the same licensing requirements
imposed upon broker-dealers and other market partici-
§ 80a-5(a)(2) (closed-end companies-those that issue non-redeemable securities).
320. See id. § 4(2), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-4(2).
321. See id. § 4(1), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-4(1).
322. ICL Draft, supra note 301, arts. 9-11.
323. Registration requirements are arguably the most important part of any
legislation addressing investment companies. As David Schenker testified at the
hearings before the Senate Committee during deliberations over the 1940 Act:
"[S]ection 7 [the registration requirements of the 1940 Act] . . . is really the heart
of the legislation .... An investment company, unless it is registered or exempt,
cannot engage in any business in interstate commerce and it cannot control any
company which is engaged in interstate commerce . . . ." Investment Trusts and
Investment Companies: Hearings on S. 3580 Before the Subcomm. on Securities and
Exch. of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 76th Cong. 198 (3d Sess.
1940) [hereinafter 1940 Senate Hearings] (statement of David Schenker, Chief
Counsel, SEC, Investment-Trust Study).
324. ICL Draft, supra note 301, art. 9, para. 2.
325. Id. art. 10.
326. Investment Companies Act of 1940 § 7(a), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-7(a) (no com-
pany can do business unless registered); id. § 8, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-8 (registration
requirements).
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pants.32 ' This solution provides uniformity in licenses for all
market participants and makes it easier for the NSC, which
has yet to acquire expertise and powers similar to those of the
SEC, to control the process of licensing. Second, unlike the
1940 Act, which specifies exemptions for certain investment
companies,328 the ICL Draft has no exemptions from its li-
censing process. In that respect, the Draft adheres to the same
rigid principles as the Securities Decree." 9
The final licensing requirement of the ICL Draft pertains
to managers of investment companies. The ICL Draft defines a
company's manager as "any person holding a license for man-
aging a Company within the statutorily set confines who has
signed a contract to manage the Company."3 ' These persons,
according to article 11 of the ICL Draft, must be licensed by
the NSC.33' This provision most closely parallels section 203
of the Investment Advisers Act,3 2 which requires investment
advisers to register with the SEC, and carries the same pur-
pose of taking "a compulsory census of the industry and [pre-
venting] persons with certain criminal records from acting as
investment advisers."333 To that end, a person who has been
found guilty of violating Kazakhstani laws on securities, forg-
ery or counterfeiting is prohibited from being employed as a
manager of an investment company!"
As we have already observed in the context of discussing
the Securities Decree, Kazakhstani securities laws follow the
philosophy of the U.S. securities laws in that the government
does not guarantee the quality of investments, but rather as-
sures that all the information is disclosed to the investing
public.335 Similarly, during the Congressional hearings of the
1940 Act, the SEC emphasized time and again "that the inves-
tors are the judges of the legal and economic arrangements
which they purchase and that the [19401 Act does not impose
327. ICL Draft, supra note 301, art. 10.
328. Investment Companies Act of 1940 § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-6.
329. See supra text accompanying notes 161-64.
330. ICL Draft, supra note 301, art. 2, para. 9.
331. Id. art. 11.
332. Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 203, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3 (1994).
333. 2 FRANKEL, supra note 307, B§1, at 103 (citing 1940 Senate Hearings,
supra note 323, at 519 (statement of David Schenker)).
334. See ICL Draft, supra note 301, art. 19.
335. See supra text accompanying notes 171-73.
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any standards with respect to the securities in which invest-
ment companies may invest their assets."36 Nonetheless, the
1940 Act restricted the freedom of investment companies to
invest in risky ventures. United States investment companies
must disclose to the investing public their investment policies
in advance. 37 Furthermore, investment companies must seek
approval of the majority of shareholders before changing their
investment policies. 3 ' Finally, the SEC is empowered to reg-
ulate certain transactions that are deemed to be particularly
risky.33 9
All these restrictions fight potential abuses mostly through
disclosure, rather than through substantive regulation. Even
though the 1940 Act imposes more substantive regulation than
the other U.S. securities statutes, the substantive limits im-
posed on U.S. investment companies relate to acquisitions that
may cause problems for acquired companies34 and acquisi-
tions which may result in the duplication of managerial fees
paid by the investors3 41 Still, the ICL Draft imposes many
more substantive restrictions on the investment companies'
activities than does the 1940 Act. 2 Why did the drafters of
the ICL Draft abandon the disclosure philosophy generally
underlying securities regulation and resort to the substantive
restrictions? We can only assume that, because of the impor-
tance of investment funds in the process of privatization, the
drafters of the ICL Draft wanted to make sure that these
funds will not undermine public trust in privatization by en-
gaging in fraudulent practices. Whatever the reasons, the an-
ticipatory nature of the Kazakhstani securities regulation prob-
ably justifies the inclusion of more substantive restrictions
than in traditional responsive securities regulation.
As a part of its substantive mandate, article 15 of the ICL
Draft prohibits investment companies from conducting any
336. 3 FRANKEL, supra note 307, A§l, at 231 (citing 1940 Senate Hearings,
supra note 323, at 223 (statement of David Schenker)).
337. See Investment Companies Act of 1940 § 8(b)(1)-(3), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-
8(b)(1)-(3) (1994).
338. See id. § 13(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-13(a)(3).
339. See, e.g., id § 12(a)-(b), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-12(a)-(b).
340. See, e.g., id. § 12(d)(1)(A)(ii), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-12(d)(1)(A)(ii); id. § 12(g), 15
U.S.C. § 80a-12(g) (as applied to ownership by investment companies of securities
issued by insurance companies).
341. See id. § 12(d)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-12(d)(1).
342. ICL Draft, supra note 301, art. 15.
598 [Vol. XXI:3
19971 KAZAKHSTANI SECURITIES REGULATION
activity other than the business of investment, or activity re-
lated to the business of investment.34 Financial soundness of
an investment company is assured by forbidding it to borrow
money from a bank to buy securities;'" to issue guarantees of
any kind;3" to perform mortgage transactions;46 to incur
debt above the limits prescribed by the NSC;' 7 or to invest in
securities of one issuer above the limits prescribed by the
NSC.345 An investment company is also restricted in its abili-
ty to limit the voting powers of its investors-shareholders:
Article 15 prohibits issuance of preferred shares.349
An investment company is prohibited from purchasing
voting shares of a joint-stock company if such a purchase re-
sults in the investment company's affiliated group ownership of
the joint-stock company's voting shares in amounts exceeding
the NSC limits."' Finally, for purposes of investor protection,
investment companies may not engage in short sales or pur-
chases of securities;35' invest in its own securities or in secu-
rities of other investment companies, except for mergers;352 or
invest in securities which may subject the investment company
to full liability for the issuer's business.53
The final important aspect of the ICL Draft regulatory
scheme is that it creates express civil liability, for a company
and its manager, to shareholders for damage caused to the
company and its shareholders." This simple liability provi-
sion is the ICL Draft's substitute for the complex scheme of
express and implied rights of action under the 1940 Act. 5
343. Id. para. 3.
344. See id. para. 4.
345. See id. para. 10.
346. See id.
347. See id. para. 9.
348. See id. para. 6.
349. Id. para. 4.
350. See id. para. 5.
351. See id. para. 8.
352. See id. para. 14.
353. See id. para. 11.
354. Id. art. 17, para- 2.
355. The 1940 Act gives an express right of action to investment companies'
shareholders for an investment adviser's breach of fiduciary duty. See Investment
Companies Act of 1940 § 36(b), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (1994). In addition, there is
an express right of action for short-swing profit taking by insiders. See id. § 30(f),
15 U.S.C. § 80a-29(f). Finally, the 1940 Act, because of its broadly remedial na-
ture, was held to provide a host of implied rights of action. See 4 FRANKEL, supra
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Moreover, article 17 of the ICL Draft is a reference provision,
rather than a straight grant of a right of action: it refers, for
purposes of finding liability, to the laws of the Republic of
Kazakhstan.3" Therefore, article 17 liability is founded on
liability pursuant to the Civil Code of Kazakhstan. The general
remedies under the Civil Code are discussed elsewhere in the
article.3 7 It is useful, however, to emphasize once again that
generic civil remedies do not always fit the securities market.
Since the law has not yet been adopted, the Kazakhstani legis-
lature has an opportunity to include in the ICL Draft more
specific, express liabilities provisions.
As a very brief overview of investment companies regula-
tion in Kazakhstan indicates, the ICL Draft is a simplified
version of the 1940 Act, which is the longest and probably the
most complex legislation among all five federal securities stat-
utes.3" The simplicity of the ICL in comparison to the 1940
Act is justified by the conditions of the Kazakhstani market.
Most of the complexities of the 1940 Act are inapplicable to the
investment vehicles that exist in Kazakhstan. Although securi-
ties regulation should be made with an eye toward future de-
velopments, excessively complex regulation could unduly bur-
den the Kazakhstani market, which simply does not have the
capacity to generate the structures envisioned by such regula-
tion. In the case of the ICL Draft, it appears that this simple
and straightforward law, if adopted, will serve its main goal of
creating an improved sense of fiduciary obligation and commer-
cial morality.5 9 It will send a message to the investment
funds and their management that attempts to defraud inves-
tors by using an investment company status will not be toler-
ated and that the Kazakhstani government has a legislative
tool to fight such attempts.
note 307, B§8.1, at 539 (citing Brown v. Bullock, 194 F. Supp. 207, 223-28
(S.D.N.Y.), affd, 294 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1961)).
356. ICL Draft, supra note 301, art. 17, para. 2.
357. See supra text accompanying notes 236-43, 258, 270, 289-91.
358. See 1 FRANKEL, supra note 307, at xiii.
359. See supra note 303 and accompanying text.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Dean Robert Clark broke down the history of capitalism
into several stages. 60 In the first stage, the economy was
dominated by entrepreneurs, also called robber barons, who
managed their own capital.36' This stage lasted throughout
the nineteenth century and was characterized by the enact-
ment of general incorporation statutes and "enabling" laws. 62
As the economy developed further, new ventures required
extensive investments of capital in the amounts beyond the
resources of even the richest entrepreneurs. At this point, "the
entrepreneurial function was split into ownership and control,"
and capitalism entered its second stage of professional man-
agement.3" This stage "required the legal system to develop
stable relationships between professional managers and public
investors, ostensibly aimed at keeping the former accountable
to the latter, but also at placing full control of business deci-
sions in the managers' hands."' The U.S. government re-
sponded to this new trend by adopting federal securities
laws. 65 The third stage has further separated ownership into
capital and investment and professionalized investment man-
agement.
366
The development of capitalism in Kazakhstan and the rest
of the former communist bloc hardly fits the model suggested
by Dean Clark. There, although capitalism is undergoing stag-
es of development, the lines between stages are blurred and
the transition from one stage to another is occurring with
lightning speed. Only yesterday, just a handful of businessmen
unexpectedly emerged from a barren Soviet economy with
courage enough to jump into the stormy waters of free entre-
preneurship. Today, we already see an increasing class of peo-
ple who have accumulated significant capital and are now
willing to invest this capital by using the services of profes-
sional managers.
360. Robert Charles Clark, The Four Stages of Capitalism: Reflections on Invest-
ment Management Treatises, 94 HARV. L. REV. 561, 562-69 (1981).
361. See id. at 562.
362. See id.
363. Id. at 563.
364. Id.
365. See id.
366. See id. at 564.
BROOK. J. INTL L.
The governments of former communist countries do not
have the luxury of an evolutionary, slow-going development of
capitalism. While the Rockefellers and the Vanderbilts learned
the basics of capitalism from their own experience, Soviet capi-
talists have scores of academic works and dozens of mentors
available at their disposal. And these Western mentors teach
them not only the principles of honest business and fair deal-
ing, but also fraudulent tricks and deceptive devices perfected
throughout the history of capitalism. In fact, fraud and deceit
are so common among these new capitalists that the govern-
ments of the former Soviet Republics cannot even afford a
quick response to economic changes; they have to anticipate
these changes and act accordingly.
From that point of view, it is not too early for securities
regulation in Kazakhstan, and may, in fact, be a little late. It
is true that Kazakhstani securities regulators and the
Kazakhstani judiciary do not have sufficient expertise to han-
dle complex securities matters. Countless regulations need to
be adopted to assure proper functioning of the market. The
accounting system has to undergo cardinal changes to make
financial statements truly indicative of the companies' finan-
cial health. But all these problems must be resolved before, not
after, the securities market in Kazakhstan has reached its full
capacity.
Certainly, the Kazakhstani market has a great deal to
offer investors, both Western and domestic. And the fact that
this market has already caught the eye of reputable Western
investment funds is further evidence of its potential. Whether
this potential is to be realized is a question to be resolved by
the market regulators. Only they can assure the smooth opera-
tion of the market and thereby attract investors to it. The
alternative is a gradual withdrawal of all investments and
extinction of the market.
The average investor has a relatively low tolerance for
unjustifiable risks, such as chaos in a market. He or she will
not become active in the market as long as a chaotic state
exists and as long as the only law that governs such a market
is "kill or be killed." Investors want to have a certain degree of
confidence in the market, and only governmental regulation of
the market can give them such confidence. Nobody expects the
government to guarantee the economic value of investments,
but at the very least, investors want to be sure that they will
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not be cheated out of their life savings by crooked brokers
running sham operations. This assurance is something that the
government can provide.
At present, the Kazakhstani securities market and its
regulation are more of a fairy tale than a reality. There is a
good chance, however, that a securities market in Kazakhstan
will be created because Kazakhstan is ready, willing, and able
to undergo the process of transformation of a securities market
on paper into a real securities market. The process may take a
long time, but the first pieces of legislation reviewed in this
article demonstrate that Kazakhstan is moving in the right
direction.
Traditionally, the securities markets in the world were
initiated by merchants; governments intervened only decades
later. In the process of studying Kazakhstan and other former
Soviet Republics, we observe a completely different phenome-
non. The government regulation of securities in these countries
is designed primarily to develop and build the market. Wheth-
er or not this experiment will succeed remains to be seen. At
the present time, the probability of success of anticipatory
securities regulation in Kazakhstan can be expressed by Pro-
fessor Poser's view of developmental securities regulation in
Brazil, which is equally applicable to Kazakhstani securities
regulation:
[The Brazilian program of securities regulation] represents a
conscious attempt to alter habits of investment and to build
capital markets through the creation of high legal and ethical
standards of behavior-a "climate" in which mutual confi-
dence between company managements, financial intermediar-
ies, and investors can exist. Although it is still too soon to
estimate its success, I believe that it is already beginning to
change the attitude of... investors toward the stock market,
if only because the very interest that the [Brazilian] govern-
ment has shown is taken by many to mean that these mar-
kets have a promising future."7
Such is the promising future of the Kazakhstani securities
market.
367. Poser, supra note 41, at 1306.
603

